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Coord I iator, Energy Research Group
This report brings together three papers on energy demand presented at the
Energy Research Priorities Seminar held in Ottawa on 8-10 August 1983.
The paper by Professor Lutz Hoffmann suggests a framework In which energy
demand studies may be organized if they are to be useful in policy-making.
Although energy-demand relationships have attracted extensive investigations,
the stability of the parameters they have estimated is much in question, and the
use of their average values for prediction or planning remains hazardous.
Hoftmann points toward disaggregation and the analysis of the chain of energy
transformations as possible paths toward more stable and reliable parameters.
Professor Lee Schipper and his colleagues point to another factor that
leads to instability in sectoral parameters, namely a changeover from one tech-
nology to another: insofar as technologies producing a product (or service) vary
in their energy intensity, a technological shift will also change the energy
intensity of the product. Rapid technological change is characteristic of some
sectors in developing countries, and may well account for the high aggregate
GOP-elasticities of energy consumption observed.
Dr. Yoshlo Hara begins with estimates of these elasticities, which were
greater than one for all the member countries of the Asian Development Bank in
1961-78. The high elasticities, together with extreme oil dependence, made them
vulnerable to the drastic rise in the oil price after 1973. Dr. Hara
distinguishes three diverging patterns of national experience. The oil-surplus
countries naturally gained from the rise in the oil price. Among oil-deficit
countries, the newly industrialized countries expanded their exports so rapidly
4 that the oil crisis no longer worried them. For the rest, balance of payments
adjustments became a prime concern of policy. Whether they dealt with the oil
bill by borrowing, by import substitution, or by demand restraint, the impact of
energy on their growth was unmistakable.
Thus Dr. Hara's empirical paper shows why energy-demand studies, and
energy studies in general, deserve to be taken seriously. Although oil consump-
tion among the market economies has fallen since 1979, and oil prices have been
under downward pressure, it would boa mistake to think that energy supply has
ceased to constrain growth in the developing countries. The present low-growth
equilibrium in the energy markets tells us nothing about the growth rates that
can be achieved without running into an energy-supply constraint: such a con-
straint is implicit even now in the case of those oil-deficit, debt-ridden
developing economies that are finding it impossible to balance their payments,
and their ranks would be joined by more developing countries if world energy
demand were to increase faster.
ENEJY DEMAND I P1 DEVELOP I PG ()XJNTR I ES:
IDENTIFICATION CF RESEARDI AREAS
Lutz HoffmannM
There has been a considerable amount of research about energy demand in
developed and developing countries during recent years. As a result, we now
know much more about the orders of magnitude involved, as well as the structure
of energy demand by sector and fuel and its determinants, than we did a decade
ago when the incipient oil crisis began to rock national and international en-
ergy markets. However, with the growing number of research studies, it has
increasingly become apparent that there are many more open questions than orig-
inal ly conceived. These not only refer to basic data and empirical results, but
also are closely lnterlinked with unresolved methodological Issues.
I attempt here to identIfy areas where research on energy demand seems to
be needed for developing countries. I hope that during the discussion a consen-
sus on priorities will emerge.
Research for Whom?
Which of the many open questions is to be tackled first depends on the
consumer of the research results. A minister responsible for energy policy in
Canada is probably confronted with quite different problems and therefore wants
to know different things about energy demand than his colleague In Kenya or an
oil company operating off-shore from Argentina.
The first thing that must be done therefore is to define the consumer and
try to Identify his interest. I make the assumption that, in the context of
this conference, it Is the government official in a developing country dealing
with energy planning and energy policy on whom we focus. When I come to identi-
fying his interest, I must again make assumptions, because up to now we may know
from particular officers in particular countries what their concerns are, but
there does not exist a representative picture of the developing world as a whole
or for certain regions, it should be realized that much of what we know from
the literature or from conference statements about the concerns of energy plan-
ners and poiicymakers in developing countries is filtered by those doing the
reporting, who have their own interests, such as international financing insti-
tut ions, United Nations experts, or experts providing so-cal led technical aid.
My first suggestion therefore is to conduct a survey among energy planners and
policymakers in developing countries about what they consider as the most pres-
sing issues to be researched. This would be simi lar to the survey undertaken
several years ago, by Fred Bergsten on behalf of the Ford Foundation, about
research issues in international economics.
Keeping this in mind, I suggest that the energy policymaker in a develop-
ing country needs information on energy demand to answer the fol lowing set of
questions:
In which areas is investment required for the development of indigenous
energy resources;
In which areas is investment required for inducing energy saving; and
In which areas is it possible to improve energy saving without major invest-
ments.
*Lehrstuhl Fuer Volkswlrtschaftslehre, Universitaot Regensburg, Universi-
taetsstrasse 29-31, Regensburg, West Germany.
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To answer these questions with respect to energy demand, the policymaker
must understand:
The relationship between expected or planned economic activity and enercy
demand;
The technically and economically feasible potential for reducing energy
demand through energy saving; and
The likely reaction of energy consumers to the entire range of exogenous
parameter changes and of policy measures.
Relationship between Economic Activity and Eneray Deuumnd
The energy planner Is often in a very difficult position. On the one hand,
the macroeconomic planner supplies information on expected developments of sec-
toral output, personal income, and population and on the other the energy pro-
ducer supplies targets for the expansion of fuel output. The energy planner's
basic function then is to see whether the two are consistent and, if not, to
work out proposals where adjustments could or should be made.
Analyzing the various steps of energy dennd
To analyze the various steps, the energy planner first has to conceptualize
the link between economic activity and energy consumption. In the past, this
was often done by relating economic output to either final or primary energy
consumption. The parameters estimated were income or output elasticities for
final fuels, such as gasoline, kerosine, electricity, etc., or for primary
fuels, such as crude oil, solid fuels, gases, and primary electricity. This ap-
proach, which was adopted by most econometric research studies, is methodolog-
ically unsatisfactory because it neglects the intermediate steps between eco-
nomic output and fuel consumption. The result is not only the derivation of un-
reliable and opaque parameters but also a systematic neglect of how fuel demand
is affected by these intermediate steps and what this implies for fuel-saving
measures.
I conclude that any analysis of energy demand should explicitly consider the
entire range of steps Involved -- even if the data do not permit all of them to
be quantified. This means that It should be made explicit that the immediate
demand of a private household or a production unit is not final energy, but an
energy service, measured as passenger distance or smelted iron or a warm house.
The demand for energy services leads to a certain demand for useful energy in
the form of heat, motive power, or light, depending on the energy conversion
equipment (Fig. 1). The important implication of these two steps is that the
energy demand generated by economic activities or private households is, as
such, not fuel-specific, it only becomes fuel-specifIc If certain technologies
are assumed that convert available final energy into useful energy. Hence
estimated elasticity parameters for final or primary fuels underlie the implicit
assumption that conversion technologies are given, or change at best along the
time trend of the past, That technologies can chanqe due to innovations, in-
vestment decisions, government policy, etc. is not accounted for. It is there-
fore not surprising that, first, estImated elasticities for a particular fuel
tend to show a wide range of variation over different time periods and in di f-
ferent countries and second, that because of this, projections based on them
turn out to be highly unreliable.
Although engineers have always been aware of the different steps of energy





























Fig. I. Steps of energy demand for three examples.
economists have only rarely used them as a basis for analysis. As a result we
know very little about the relationship between economic activity and the demand
for energy services and useful energy.
Some information for industrial countries is available from engineering
analysis. However, this Is certainly not sufficient and often not applicable to
developing countries where either technologies are di fferent (e.g., cooking
equipment in the residential sector or transport equipment) or the same technol-
ogies are employed differently -- often less efficiently. We also have no em-
pirical answer to the implications of engineering analysis at the industrial or
sectoral level. Such answers are crucial for planning purposes, which by neces-
sity require some sort of aggregation.
I therefore strongly suggest that, also for developing countries, consid-
erably more analysis should be done on:
The relationship between economic activity and the demand for energy ser-
vices; and
The relationship between the demand for energy services and the demand for
useful energy.
It must, however, be realized that empirical research in this area is not
straiqhtforward. The first task, for instance, involves conceptual difficul-
ties. The variable energy service has to be made operational: for transport,
the energy service Is the movement of persons or commodities over a certain dis-
tance; for the residentIal sector, cooking of food is also an energy service;
and for the steel industry, smelting of iron ore is an energy service. These
services are apparently difficult to measure. We may therefore use the immed-
iate result of the energy service as a proxy, In the case of transport, we
would use ttpassengert or ttonne_distance!, for cooking the "cooked food", and
















energy service cooked food passenger distance warm house
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There are more difficulties, however. Some of those proxies are two-di-
mensional, whereas for quantitative analysis one-dimensional variables are more
convenient. A cool house, for Instance, is a proxy for air-conditioning. It
has the two dimensions, temperature and house size. To estimate the rela-
tionship between, for instance, per capita consumption and air-conditioning,
quantitative measures for a cool house must be translated into a one-dimensional
variable that could be regressed against per capita consumption.
The second task involves the estimation of energy intensities, defined as
useful energy per unit of energy service as measured by immediate output. As
data on useful energy do not exist for most developing countries, there is also
no information available on energy intensities as I have defined them. We need
Information on the absolute levels of intensities as well as their changes over
time, The absolute levels of intensities have to be known because we must gen-
erally work with some kind of aggregate, as noted earlier. The energy intensity
of an aggregate can change simply due to a changing structure of the aggregate
if the intensity levels of its components differ but do not change themselves.
Changes over time in the intensities of the elements could reinforce or offset
the impact of structural change.
Importance of di fferent levels of aggregation
The aggregation problem gives rise to a wide area of badly needed research
results. Many of the research studies in the mld-1970s -- In particular those
for developing countries -- were on a highly aggregated level. The most discus-
sed relationship was the overall income elasticity or the overall energy inten-
sity, measured by either final or primary energy consumption per unit of gross
domestic product (GOP). The poor results of many forecasts based on this rela-
tionship led to a demand for more disagqregated models. This demand certainly
is legitimate. However, the tendency now is to favour analysis on the micro
level. This Is of value for project analysis or speci fic conservation measures
but it is of little help for energy planning and many fields of policymaking.
We therefore will continue to need energy demand analysis at various levels of
aggregation.
One important point here is to find out how the stability of a parameter
is related to the level of aggregation of the underlying variables. This infor-
mation is very important for energy modelling and forecasting. For instance, a
model builder may want to know whether it is sufficient to distinguish among the
agriculture, industry, transport, commercial, and residential sectors or whether
(and under which conditions) it is advisable to subdivide "industry" into
energy-intensive and less energy-intensive Industries and to subdivide "trans-
port" into different transport modes, etc.
Also with respect to fuels, too fine a disaggregation of demand analysis
is often more confusing than illuminating. This follows Immediately from the
statement that energy demand generated by economic activities or private house-
holds is, as such, not fuel-sped fic. It is obvious that how private households
satisfy their needs for heat, light, and power depends first of all on what they
can get, i.e., availability. There may be a preference for liquid fuels over
solid fuels, but within liquid fuels and within solid fuels preferences will be
hard to identi fy. A too-disaqgregated projection, for instance demand for resi-
dential kerosine or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), may then give the wrong irn-
pression that there is little choice among alternative patterns of fuel supply.
Too little research on noncomercial energy
The need for considerably more research efforts in the field of so-called
noncommercial energy has been stressed by many researchers and policymakers.
The data problem for noncommercial energy is still rmich greater then for com-
mercial energy, although an increasing amount of data is forthcoming from
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various research efforts. Most of these studies refer to noncommercial energy
consumption in the residential sector and only a few Include information about
manufacturing and agriculture. This is a gap where research Is urgent, because
noncommercial eneray is very important for small-scale manufacturing in rural
areas. With the present emphasis in development strategies on integrated rural
development, the Impact of such a strategy on noncommercial energy and an even-
tual transition to commercial fuels ought to be known.
A particular difficulty of noncommercial energy-demand analysis is the
uncertainty about its determinants. For commercial energy, the hypothesis that
income and prices are the most important determinants, if supply is available,
Is fairly well established. If we have to deal with noncommercial energy in the
real sense, i.e., the fuels are not exchanged against money, then by definition,
prices can have no direct Impact and also monetary income becomes a dubious
variable.
The question Is not only what are the determinants of noncommercial fuels
in general, but why do we observe differences or changes over time In the con-
sumption pattern of specific noncommercial fuels. For instance, a change in
demand from twigs to crop wastes or dung may have Important implications for the
supply of fertilizer and thus affect agricultural productivity. The example
illustrates that, unlike most commercial fuels, the use of blomass as fuel often
competes directly on the end-use level with alternative uses as fertilizer, con-
struction material (logs), etc.
Such questIons call for more field research based on very carefully de-
signed interviews about motivations for using a certain noncommercial fuel. In
addition, a comprehensive effort to assemble and to evaluate the widely scat-
tered data and qualitative informatIon collected by individuals, research
groups, government bodies, and international institutions would be a very re-
warding effort. It Is time that a data bank for noncommercial energy be estab-
lished somewhere whose services would be available to planners in developing
countries and researchers around the cilobe.
Potential for Energy Saving
Energy saving may be defined for energy as a whole or for Individual
fuels. It can be measured by changes in energy consumption per unit of output
(energy intensity). I have defined energy intensity as useful energy per energy
service measured by Its immediate output. However, as long as the conceptual
and data problems with energy services and useful energy are not solved, the
ratio of final energy or primary energy per unit of output will be used in-
stead. It should be noted that the definition chosen can be quite important for
the results obtained. The energy intensity in terms of final energy need not
move In the same direction as that in terms of primary energy, It also may make
a difference whether output is defined as gross output or as value added.
ldentlfyinq the sources of energy saving
The energy intensity, measured either in terms of final or primary energy,
may decline due to one of the following factors:
The conversion intensity (useful energy per unit of energy services) Is re-
duced;
The conversion efficiency (useful energy per unit of final energy) is in-
creased;
The transformation efficiency (final energy per unit of primary energy) is
increased;
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The industry mix changes in favour of sectors with low energy intensity;
The product mix within sectors changes in favour of products with low enemy
Intensity; and
The fuel mix changes in favour of fuels that can be utilized more effi-
ciently.
The need for energy intensity studies seems to be realized by severFll
researchers. The "LOC Energy Demand Study Group" concluded in its meetinq on 8
June 1983 that "there is a felt need for detailed physical enerqy/output data
for industrial processes in the form of a handbook, which could be used In en-
ergy efficiency studies. In part this need could be met by systematically col-
lecting such data in the course of standard energy audits of the kind donors
already sponsor."
The poorest information exists for conversion Intensities. Conversion
efficiencies come second. For both of these, even the present levels of magni-
tude reached in different developing countries are largely unknown. However, we
also would need to know the potential and likely changes of these indicators
over time. This could be done by first establishing the minimum intensity or
maximum efficiency that could reasonably be achieved and then working out the
path that leads to this value to determine the shape of this path and on what it
depends. Econometric time-series analysis for different sectors and countries
may be helpful. The function to be specified could include, as an explanatory
variable, an indicator of output growth. This could serve as a proxy for the
pace of autonomous capital replacement, with embodied innovation. In addition,
it may include an energy-price variable for the price-induced technical chanoe.
lip to now, information on these topics is again particularly poor in the
field of noncommercial energy. On the other hand, the potential for improve-
ments in conversion Intensity and conversion efficiency seems to be quite large
for noncommercial energy. Due to the heavy weight of noncommercial eneroy in
many developing countries, this area of research deserves high priority.
Much more solid information is available on transformation efficiencies.
in the field of commercial energy, improvements are limited in developing coun-
tries -- and where improvements are possible, the potential and the policy mea-
sures required are fairly well known. For noncommercial enercy, the situation
is different. Here again, the potential for efficiency improvement seems to be
considerable and even present efficiency levels are not very well known.
Need for sactora I and structural studies
With respect to the level of aggregation on which the analysis is to be
carried out, the same holds as for the analysis of the economic activity/energy
relationship. We not only need information on individual processes, as the LX
Energy Demand Study Group suggests, but also research about intensity reduction
or efficiency improvements on a sectoral or industry level. The energy planner
or policymaker in a developing country must be able to form an idea of the ex-
tent to which the energy intensity may decline in industry or agriculture or in
energy-intensive Industry as compared to less energy-intensive industry. Infor-
mation on individual processes is not helpful to him although it is certainly
valuable for building up the relevant information for the various sectors.
It is now well known that changes in the industry mix and the product mix
may have a considerable impact on energy saving. However, the extent to which
this may be the case under different conditions is not well understood.
The impact of structural change on energy saving is complicated by pos-
sible feedbacks. Structural change may make certain fuels more scarce and
others more abundant. This may change the structure of fuel prices: therefore
the cost and price structures may change In turn and this aqain may chanqe the
structure of fuel demand and so on. We know rather little about this type of
feedback for industrialized countries and almost nothing for developing coun-
tries. Data for a proper analysis of such phenomena are, at present, hardly
available for developing countries. Because of this, and as long as we do not
have corresponding research results for Industrial countries that would indicate
whether it is worthwhile to collect the required data, one may consider this as
a research task to be taken up later.
Another closely related issue deserves high priority because of its
importance for policymaking. This Is the impact of alternative development
strategies on energy saving, ignoring for the time being the feedbacks Just men-
tioned. Development strategies are always structural strategies. Whether the
emphasis is on import substitution or export expansion in manufacturing, or on
inteqrated rural development, there is always a correlation in terms of the
structure of output, of the size distribution of establishments, or of the
rural-urban distribution of the population.
Research during the late 1960s and the 1970s has produced a considerable
body of empirical in formation about the implications of such strategies for cap-
ital and labour intensity, but we know almost nothing about the implications for
energy intensity and hence for energy saving. I f energy is a scarce factor in a
developing country, this fact should shape development strategies in the same
way as the relative scarcities of capital and ski I led labour and the abundance
of unskilled labour. This cannot be done as long as the impact of a strategy on
energy saving is sti II in the dark.
The fuel mix is likely to be affected by all the determinants of energy
intensity discussed up to now, It means that changes in conversion intensity,
conversion efficiency, and transformation efficiency, which differ by sector or
fuel, change the fuel mix as does a changing industry mix or product mix.
Whether this implies energy saving depends on how it is defined. If it is de-
fined as fuel-specific, we will always have energy saving for the fuel substi-
tuted by another fuel. If it is measured for energy as a whole, the results
depend on the levels of the intensities or efficiencies by sector and fuel. It
would be worthwhile to explore in different developing countries which type of
fuel substitution would have the greatest impact on sector-speci fic and overall
energy saving. This would help planners to design policy measures that induce
such substitution processes.
Reaction of Energy Consumers to Exogenous Parameter
Changes and Policy Measures
The experience of the oil crisis in industrial as well as developing coun-
tries has clearly demonstrated that changes in exogenous parameters, such as the
international oil price or in policy measures, can significantly influence not
only the structure of energy demand but also its overall level. This is prob-
ably one of the most discussed areas of energy demand, but at the same time an
area where research was least successful in producing reliable information.
This is particularly true for the reaction of fuel demand to energy-price
changes.
Studying transmission elasticities
A first area where insufficient information is available is the impact of
international price changes, in particular for crude oil, on domestic final-
energy prices in developing countries. This impact can be expressed by a trans-
mission elasticity that measures the relative change of a domestic final-energy
price with respect to the change of crude oil or other internationally traded
fuels.
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The transmission elasticity seems to depend on the share of the imported
primary-fuel costs in the market price of the final fuel, on taxation policy, on
price regulations, and on the di fference between the domestic and the inter-
natlonal price of the final fuel. To understand how prices of internationally
traded primary fuels affect energy demand In developing countries, it is impor-
tant to know under which conditions and to what extent price changes for primary
fuels transmit themselves Into price changes for domestic final fuels. This
would probably require a comparative study for a number of developing countries.
The first and simplest task is to compile data on cost structures and to
investigate how they affect transmission elasticities under alternative market
conditions (monopolistic versus competitive markets). More difficult, but also
more interesting, is to study how governments reacted to the price increases for
imported fuels with tax policies and price regulations and why they did so. Was
this reaction a one-time possibility, as some analysts believe, or could it be
repeated?
Decomposing price reactions
The price reaction of energy demand is more complicated than many models
lead one to believe. There is first a behavioural reaction In the sense that
energy consumers demand less energy services if the price for energy in qeneral
increases. A private household, for instance, lowers its thermostat and is con-
tent with a less warm room because energy has become more expensive. I f the
energy price increase persists the household may want in addition to exchange
the energy-using equipment and thereby reduce energy consumption further, It
may, for example, exchange the present burner of the heating system for a more
efficient one, This is certainly a different reaction from the first one: the
first is behavioural and may be reversed, the second is more permanent and
structural.
The distinction between the two Is important. A behavioural reaction may
be simi iar with respect to price increases and to price decreases. An effi-
ciency reaction, on the other hand, will not be the same, It is unlikely that
an efficiency improvement induced by a former price increase wi II be reversed if
the price should decline later. By splittina up what is usually lumped under
the price elasticity, one obtains a better understanding of reactions of energy
demand to price changes.
It can be expected that, in this way, much more reliable elasticity para-
meters will be obtained and that it will become possible to predict future
changes in the price elasticity. The research required in this field is con-
siderable, Although this is a new research area for industrial as well as for
developing countries, research efforts might also start in the latter because of
the great importance generally attached to pricing policies.
Substitution elasticities: No cheers for econometrics
Econometric estimates of price elasticities have usually produced rather
poor results. Either the signs were "Incorrect" or the values obtained showed a
fairly wide range of variation. This is particularly true for time-series anal-
ysis. In energy-demand modeling, it is therefore sometimes more advisable to
use assumed elasticity parameters instead of taking estimates obtained from
tIme-series. The problem then Is, however, to justify a certain assumption,
An even more difficult problem is the estimation of cross-price elastic-
ities or substitution elasticities. Not only are consistent estimation tech-
niques complicated (simultaneous estimation technIques, Zellner alaorithm), but
also the results obtained up to now for industrial countries are not at all
encouraging. For Instance, the controversy whether capital and energy are sub-
stitutes or complementary factors of production has up to now not been resolved
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although many econometric estimates have already been made, some of which use
very detailed micro data. This leads to the conclusion that research efforts
in this direction should not be made for developinci countries. Other methods
should be developed to account for the reaction of relative fuel shares to
changes in relative fuel prices and to measure the substitution between energy
and other productive factors as a response to changes in the respective price
ratios.
Producers' or consumers' sovereignty?
One factor that seems to be very important for fuel substitution in devel-
oping countries, as compared to industrial countries, is fuel availability.
This has mostly been neglected in fuel-demand analysis. Several studies on res-
idential energy consumption have revealed that the substitution of commercial
for noncommercial fuels or of electricity for kerosine and LPG is largely deter-
mined by aval labi I ity. I f fuelwood becomes increasingly scarce, households
switch to kerosine I f they can obtain it, or to electricity I f it is avai lable.
However, the problem may be even more complicated. Rural electricity is often
not competitive with noncommercial fuels. What then usually happens is that
once power plants and transmission lines have been built, electricity is sup-
plied at heavily subsidized prices. This then leads to the switch in consump-
tion from noncommercial fuels to electricity. It is noted that this is set in
motion by the decision to have a rural electri fication program and not by an
"Independent" decision of consumers. For energy demand forecasting in develop-
inti countries, it should therefore be kept in mind that decisions to develop
domestic energy sources for local supply certainly affect the fuel consumption
pattern in a signi ficant way.
This suggests a very interesting hut also highly complicated research
task. It would seek answers to the guestion of the extent to which the energy
consumers shape the future energy-consumption pattern in a developing country,
or whether this pattern Is mainly the result of investment decisions by the pro-
ducers. Although difficult, I do not consider this guestion as unresearchable.
Sunmery of Research Tasks
The above discussion leads to the following 14 research tasks:
Run a survey among energy planners in developing countries on what they con-
ceive as the most pressing issues in energy-demand analysis.
Design operational concepts of energy services and estimate output and income
elasticities for energy services on di fferent levels of sectoral aggrega-
tion. Test the stabi I ity of the parameters for the various levels of aggre-
gation.
Collect and analyze data on noncommercial energy consumption outside the res-
idential sector.
Investigate the determinants of the demand for hiomass as fuel and for other
uses.
Set up a system for collecting data on noncommercial energy consumption and
compile the data from the various private and public sources.
Estimate the level of conversion intensities and conversion efficiencies and
their change over time on di fferent levels of sectoral aqareaation. Test the
stability of the parameters estimated for the various levels of aggregation.
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Estimate transformation efficiencies for noncommercial energy and their
change over time.
Analyze the impact of development strategies on energy demand and energy sav-
ing.
Analyze the interdependence between structural change and energy demand.
Investigate the impact of interfuel substitution on energy saving.
Analyze the factors determininci the transmission of International primary-
fuel prices on final-energy prices.
Study in more detail the price reaction of energy consumers by lookinq at
behavioural and efficiency reactions.
Investigate the reaction of relative fuel shares to changes of relative fuel
prices by employing other methods than econometric estimates.
Analyze the extent to which energy consumption patterns are determined by
investment decisions for fuel supply.
ENERGY DEMFINI) IN THE DEVELOP INS COIJNTR I ES:
TOWARD A BEUER IJI)ERSTAND I PIG1
Lee Schipper, Stephen Meyers, and Jayant Sathaye*
Energy is what both people and economies run on, thus the presence of ade-
Quate energy supplies is of the utmost Importance to a country or other entity.
Providing energy, as we have painfully qrown to learn, is not so cheap any
more. Whether we look at oil or fueiwood, new supplies are typically more
difficult and require more resources to gather. Thus, the people whose duty it
is to plan for energy supply need to have information as to the like-
ly nature of tomorrow's energy demand. Having too little energy may hinder
economic development or even jeopardize human subsistence; having too much means
there was an unnecessary expenditure of scarce resources.
These observations apply general ly, but in countries where the demand for
basic human needs exceeds the present capacity of the society to meet them, it
is particularly Important not to unnecessarily expend resources In the energy
production sector that might be spent on other areas of development. In some
developing countries, this has not been a problem because the economy has been
able to absorb whatever quantities of energy (particularly electricity) that
producers have been able to supply. With todays hiqher energy prices and more
uncertain economic outlook, however, this condition of open-ended demand is be-
coming more rare.
For some energy sources, provision of adeauate supplies may be hindered by
resource limits (as with fuelwood) or financial constraints (as with imported
oil). It then becomes important to understand how demand for these goods Is
evoivina so that those responsible can have a feel for just how bad the situa-
tion may be, and can better assess the steps that may be available to deal with
the problem.
Several facets of energy demand are crucial to the timely development of
energy supplies and their markets. First, the type of demand is important.
Some countries are developing toward a heavy Industrial mix that will rely on
heavy oils (or coal) and base-load electric power -- South Korea is a good ex-
ample. Other countries may focus more on lighter industries and agriculture, so
that lighter oils will be more Important. Some countries (Kenya, for example)
may develop large tourist industries where solar water heating can make an in
portant contribution to the energy balance. In others, a large demand for low-
temperature process heat, such as Is Important to food processing or textiles,
may make the large-scale use of biomass energy commercially interesting. In
sum, it is Important to match the available supplies economically (and physi-
cally) to the energy demands developed by a growing economy, rather than letting
a limited number of supply choices shape what demands (and economic structures)
are possible.
1 Some of the work discussed In this paper was supported by the U.S.
Department of Energy (US-DOE), Buildings Energy Research Division, under con-
tract No. DE-ACO3-76SF00098. The research for the Kenya study was funded under
a cooperative agreement between Resources for the Future and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. The current Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory study Is
supported by the US-DOE and a variety of other institutions. The authors are
staff scientists at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, and are solely responsible
for the opinions expressed here.
*Energy Analysis Program, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of Cal ifor-
nia, Berkeley, California, USA 94720.
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The size of energy markets in a developing country is also important to
supply planning. In countries with large domestic markets, such as India or
South Korea, domestic energy supplies that are expensive compared to world oil
supplies today may be worth developing for national security purposes, even if
these supplies could not be profitably sold on the world market, in Thailand,
for example, the development of natural gas finds may be crucially dependent on
development of domestic markets for the gas. On the other hand, in smaller
countries, the domestic markets may not be big enough to render exploration and
development of energy supplies interesting for nost international companies.
Gas finds could only be exploited domestically if a large, dense, distribution
network could be set up, and exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) might like-
wise prove unprofitable if the quantities available were small. Thus, the
nature of the evolving domestic energy market may provide the key to exploration
and exploitation of domestic energy reserves that would otherwise be uninterest-
ing for the world market.
From a alobal viewpoint, the evolution of energy demand in the developing
countries is an important unknown variable. The potential for substantial
growth is there, given the size of the populations and level of industrializa-
tion. A better understanding of the underlying factors that drive growth in the
industrializing countries will thus also reduce some of the uncertainty sur-
rounding future worid energy demand.
The Structure of Energy Demand in Less industrialized Countries
The Less Industrialized Countries (LiCs)2 are a very diverse set of na-
tions, yet it is possible to develop a logical framework with which one can de-
scribe the structure and evolution of energy demand in any of them. Table 1
Illustrates such a scheme. Energy demand is broken down by the well known sec-
tors, and each sector into a series of subsectors listed from the least to the
most energy-intensive. I f we could fill in the various values, we would no
doubt find that they vary widely from country to country and over time. The
fuels used In each sector also vary. With such a scheme as in Table 1, one can
look at each subsector and assess trends in demand, as well as the prospects for
renewables or for conservation in each sector. It is unlikely, for example,
that cement mills could be fired by biomass because of the enormous quantities
of fuel consumed, but it is very likely that appreciable reductions in energy
needs of cement mills could be achieved.
The chart represents the idea that the process of development encompasses
a transition within each sector as the low-energy (and low-income) activities
are replaced by those demanding more energy and producing (or consuming) more
output. For each economic activity, the energy use per unit of output depends
on the activity (i.e., cement or paper, large or small cars) and the technoloay
used to perform the activity. Using such a classi fication of an economy, one
can think about future energy needs in terms of the mix of activities and the
energy intensity of each activity. Of course, one must remember that it is ser-
vices - space conditioning, cooking, transportation, process heat, etc. -- that
are desired by consumers, not the fuel and electricity themselves. Accounting
problems are not trivial: more calories are burned cooking on a traditional
wood stove than with electric cookers, including all conversion losses (I.e.,
wood to charcoal to boiling water, fuel to electricity to household to boiling
water). Thus, the energy intensity of the more primitive activities may be
higher than that of the most advanced activities. This Is the case within
industry, since larger facilities almost always use less energy per unit of out-
put than smaller ones.
2 We feel that the term Less Industrialized Country is a more accurate and
value-neutral term to describe the countries of the world with a lesser degree
of industrialization and modernization than the usual term "Less Developed Coun-
tries."
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Light mechanized Small tractors
Heavy mechanized Large harvestors
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Nonmotor i zed Net, canoe
Motor i zed Fleets
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Table 1. ClassIfication of energy demand in LICs
One pattern that stands out among all countries is the early emergence of
the transport sector, for which few economic substitutes for oil are available.
As the country matures, the Industrial sector tends to become the largest energy
consumer, in part because manufacturing relies more on commercial fuels, in part
because manufacturing increases its output rapidly compared to agriculture.
Exactly how large the manufacturing sector. becomes, however, depends on resource
endowment because a country with rmch wood or mineral resources Is more likely
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to develop primary (and energy-intensive) industries than one without. Energy
use in the buildings sector, Including both homes and commercial buildinas,
often qrows the most quickly, as a country begins to trade the wealth it gained
from development for consumption and tertiary services like health care and
schools.
In the following sections, we give some general observations about sec-
toral energy demand in the LICs.
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
These activities tend to produce the bulk of the gross domestic product
(GOP) of low-income countries, but to use only a small amount of total com-
mercial energy. In agriculture, very low income countries have few mechanized
farms and little or no mechanical Irrigation. As incomes grow, such subsistence
farming may exist alongside largescale agriculture. Farming can be fairly
energy intensive, with energy (fertilizer, farm equipment, and irrigation) ac-
counting for a major share of factor costs. In South Korea, for example, the
amount of energy used per million won of output nearly doubled between 1970 and
1978, reflecting increasing mechanization (Kim 1981).
Fishing has a much higher energy Intensity than agriculture, althouqh the
ratio of energy use to useful protein produced may not be higher than for grains
and vegetables. Motorized fishing fleets in relatively small boats in particu-
lar tend to have a high energy intensity. In Kenya and the Senegal, we found
that the fishing sectors were very sensitive to energy costs as long as the
boats used were relatively small. Large fishing trawlers that run on heavy oil,
on the other hand, probably catch a greater tonnage per unit of energy and per
unit of energy cost, but such fleets are usually the domain of a few middle and
highincome countries.
Industry
"Primitive" industry such as weaving or basketmaking requires almost no
commercial energy. "Cottage industries," such as implement fabrication by hand,
may use very little energy directly in handforming buckets or other implements,
but rely on "upstream" energy embodied in the metal parts they use. These cot-
tage industries and light industries (textiles and tobacco) show great room for
trade-off between labour and the bundle of capital and energy. For medium
industry (food processing, fabrication and assembly, and fine chemicals), the
use of process heat is important, although at low enough temperatures to make
the use of biomass or even solar energy attractive. In heavy industry, few uses
of energy directly replace labour, unless one blows glass by hand from wood
fires or makes sun-dried mud bricks instead of concrete blocks. In most of the
mediumtoheavy industries, there is very little energy to be saved by substitu-
ting labour for machines, for such savings would not save process heat, which is
the dominant use for fuel in industry.
There is a great deal of structural growth -- development by another name
- that will increase the Importance of industrial energy use. The increase in
industrial energy use will depend on the mix of products and the technologies
used to produce them. Much of this energy is imported today, embodied in pro-
ducts such as machines or cement. It is not clear how much steel, cement, or
chemicals a country needs to consume, as evidenced by the falling quantities of
these commodities consumed per unit of GOP, or in some cases per capita, in the
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
We submit that there are no ironclad development patterns that dictate how much
raw material must be produced and consumed in any country, just as there is no
rule on how much energy is needed to prodUce a tonne of any material.
The choice of economic strategies is an important determinant of energy
demand in the industrial sector. Some African countries, for example, are very
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dependent on exports of ores or other materials related to energy-intensive
raw-material processing. For 14 African countries, mineral exports accounted
for more than 50% of export earnings In 1978, but only two of these generated
more than 10% of gross national product (Gf'JP) in industry in 1976. If these
countries want to increase the value-added obtained from these raw materials,
they must build large processing and fabrication industries. Such development
would probably tend to decrease the overall energy/output ratio for industry, as
finished products generally have a tower energy/output ratio than raw mater-
ials. Whatever the overall change in the enerqy/output ratio, a strategy that
seeks to expand downstream production will increase energy needs in a country
markedly. What must be understood today are the links between the various pos-
sible industrial mixes open to a country still growing and the energy needs as-
sociated with those mixes.
Transport
The transport sector Is very heterogeneous. Although human and animal
power sti II abound in the rural areas of low-income countries, rail and road
networks are crucial for the expansion of trade and the commercial economy. At
low incomes, commercial and traditional transport of freight and people dom-
inates activity and energy use. Only as Incomes rise does truly private trans-
port -- the private use of private cars -- become important. In Kenya, we noted
that automobile energy use only passed that for trucks and rail combined in the
early 1970s, and of the cars in Kenya, at least one-third were owned by comp-
anies or agencies. Air travel is a luxury in most developinq countries and
international travel dominates except in large countries such as India.
The future of transport energy use in lower- and middle-income countries
is very dependent on choices made today about the road and rail infrastructure,
settlement patterns, and localization of industry. Cities such as Bangkok and
Caracas are choked by traffic, In the latter case reinforced by low gasoline
prices. Even In Nairobi, however, traffic jams at rush hours and lunch are a
daily occurrence. Much of the private transport energy is consumed by high-
income consumers for whom energy prices are not important, but use of energy for
freight or commercial purposes appears to be price-sensitive, as evidenced by
the rapid fuel switching encountered in countries where dl fferentlals exist be-
tween gasoline, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), or even biomass-based
fuels.
Residential
The residential uses of energy are well known: space conditioning, water
heating, electric (or gas) appliances for washing, motors, communications, and
cleaning and cooking. In low-Income countries, cooking dominates, whereas in
high-income countries cooking may be the smallest energy use in most house-
holds. In many of the countries of Africa, the calorific content of biomass
fuels used for cooking exceeds the amount of all other energy consumed for all
other purposes.
-
Patterns differ sharply between rural and urban households. Among rural
and periurban or urban low-income consumers, renewable fuels for cooking far
outweigh uses of commercial fuels and electricity. In cities, electricity, ker-
osine, and LPG appear, and even natural gas where it is available. We found in
Kenya, however, that the use of electricity was sharply delineated between those
middle- and upper-Income households with consumption patterns similar to house- -
holds of comparahle incomes in Europe, and thousands of marginal consumers who
might have only a few lights and a radio. For poor households, kerosine serves
as the source of lighting, and other energy services (except cooking) are ab-
sent.
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Table 2 Saturation of home appliances (percent of homes)
Sources: LBL Residential Data Base (OECD countries) and reports from indi-
vidual countries.
a Survey of middle- and upper-income households.
it is important to realize that urban housholds all over the world seem to
be adopting similar patterns of energy use in homes (excluding space heating).
We have assembled (Table 2) some figures on appliance saturations from a variety
of studios, including our own survey of the OECD countries (see Schipper and
Ketoff 1983). Other data from Thai land and the Republic of Korea and Singapore
present a similar message: as a country approaches middle-income status, proba-
bly around US$1000/person, households with electricity begin to acquire all
kinds of devices, and electricity use grows very rapidly. In Korea, for ex-
ample, annual growth rates exceeded 15% per household in the mid-197Os. The
number of appliances doubled very rapidly, in Kenya, on the other hand, In-
creases in consumption per household were minimal, because the real middle-class
consumer has yet to emerqe and the largest consumers are predominantly wealthy
Kenyans or foreigners.
The greatest uncertainty in the future of the household sector is the rate
of urbanization and the subsequent substitution of some or all of the renewable
energies used today (dung, wood, charcoal, etc.) with commerciai energy forms.
In Taiwan, this process is complete, and virtually every household is electri-
fied. In South Korea, there are still many households using wood for heating,
but electrification has passed 80%. In Kenya, only 8% of all homes have elec-
tricity, although the proportion rises to 30% in areas where electricity is
actually available, it is very important to watch the developments in residen-
tial energy use at a great level of detail, distinguishing among types of con-
sumers, patterns of consumption, and location across Income groups. Note that
water heating is Important in developed-country househoids, accounting for as
much as 25% of the fuel consumed In the sector. There is a great potential for
avoiding this fuel or electricity use by timely introduction of solar hot-water
heating in sunny countries, as is occurring now In Kenya and many other coun-
tries as well.
Cenwnerc I a I
The commercial sector is a bit of a catch-all, containing buildings and
aiso a variety of other energy uses such as gas and waterworks, communications
facilities, street lighting, airports, and even golf courses and drive-in mov-

















Dishwasher 36 17 22 17 - - - -
TV 99 99 90 94 90 96 40 7
Refrigerator 100 99 95 94 85 82 20 5
Freezer 38 65 20 10 - - -
Clothes washer 75 88 80 75 73 ca.5 -
Air conditIoner 55 0 0 1 20 15 5
Electric water
heater 33 17 27 41 5 ca,4 ca.4 1
Gas water heater 53 - 30 15 5 - 1 -
Electric range/oven 52 95 48 2 3 - - 1
Gas range/oven 40 5 40 95 70 - 3
Electric rice cooker - - - 90 84 -
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world and those in the OECD countries, but buildings In rural areas may be very
poorly lit and ventilated with few of the amenities common to city buildings,
Indeed, many "restaurants" or "stores" may be little more than tents or other
simple structures with no electricity and only a wood or charcoal fire as evi-
dence of energy use. The same contrast is true of the streets themselves, which
tend to be lit in the major cities hut unlit and often even poorly defined else-
where.
To understand building energy use, It Is necessary to divide buildings up
by vintage, by type of equipment, by function (e.g., water heating and lifts),
and by purpose (e.g., hospitals and hotels). From surveys of buildings in the
USA, we know that energy requirements can differ radical iy depending on both the
functions and the building purpose. Moreover, there Is a clear progression
towards greater amenities (I.e., space comfort, ventilation, and lighting) In
buildings In countries with higher incomes. At the same time, however, the en-
ergy Intensity of a clven service may vary by an order of magnitude between two
bul Idlngs.
Among the subsectors In the commercial sector, the hotel, schools, and
hospitals subsectors are particularly intensive users of hot water. In Kenya
and elsewhere, there are ample opportunities for using solar systems to provide
much of this hot water. We have found that, In nearly every warm country, there
is a clear distinction between large bul ldlnqs designed with shading bul It Into
the facade elements, and large unwieldy structures with facades exposed directly
to sunlight. Of all the major economic sectors, the commercial sector is likely
to use more electricity, as a fraction of all energy purchased, than other sec-
tors, and to grow the most rapidly with middle-Income status. Unfortunately,
the needs for air conditioning and the predominant use of buildings during day-
time hours make electric power demands In this sector very peaked, causing dif-
ficulties for utilities that do not have access to reserves of hydropower to
meet peak demands. A danger In many developing countries Is that the problems
of energy efficiency In the building sector go ignored today because that sector
appears small in relation to the other sectors. Yet in only one or two decades,
fuel and electricity use in the bul Idlngs sector can be four to six times what
it Is today. In Italy and In South Korea, for example, growth rates in both the
residential and the commercial sectors were more than 10% per year for many
years, while electricity use in commercial buildings in Singapore was also grow-
ing very rapidly until a conservatiorr campaign was begun. In Tokyo, the appear-
ance of air conditioning In the short space of only 10 years made an enormous
Impact on the yearly load curve of the Tokyo utility, adding a peak of about 20%
to the base demand. Thus, the building sector can move from obscurity to the
forefront in a very short time.
Understanding Changing Deuvmnd: looking Behind Energy Statistics
Gaining a meaningful understanding of energy demand and how it is evolving
in a country or other entity is not easy. The basic problems are all too famil-
iar to anyone who has done energy analysis: data reliability and data nonexis-
tence. These problems are particularly well known In LlCs. Data are, none-
theless, obtainable. In small countries, the number of important energy users
is few, whereas in larqer countries or those that have reached middle-income
status, an infrastructure that collects and even analyzes data often exists. In
Kenya, our study was carried out by visiting 40 firms and obtaining sales fig-
ures for 100 others from suppliers, as well as by sorting the uti I ity-sales data
by individual customer. In the Philippines, the Bureau of Energy Utilization
has put a program in place that essentially collects such data. Thus the prob-
lem Is not that data cannot be gathered, but that there Is a lack of resources,
personnel, or interest in gathering and using it.
In this paper, we would like to address a third, and often neglected,
area: data assembly and interpretation. By "data assembly," we mean the group-
ing of data In such a way as to give insight on things that people want to know
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about. That Is, to allow interpretation of trends that may otherwise remain
hidden behind the well known statistics.
Our central thesis is this: What is needed is less focus on aqgregate
energy-demand statistics and more focus on the factors that drive energy de-
mand. One must distinguish between statistics that are important and data that
are useful in increasing understanding. Total oil demand in a given year, for
example, is an important statistic, but it does not really help us to understand
what is going on. it provides only a weak basis for estimating what next year's
oil demand will be. in the old days of forecasting by extrapolation, this was
perhaps good enough. But in today's more uncertain situation, few would still
rely on it as a basis for planning. We first need to know where the oil pro-
ducts are consumed: in factories, in power plants, in cars and trucks, In
homes, etc. We are then in a position to assess what is happening within each
of these areas0
The above may seem obvious. Indeed, many developing countries now have a
respectable sectoral breakdown of energy consumption. in most cases, however,
the work stops with this sectoral breakdown. This is not enough! Although a
historical time-series can tell us about growth rates in consumption of various
fuels and about the chanqing fuel mix, it does not shed any light on the forces
that are shaping consumption patterns. These forces include such things as the
number of homes, the amount of commerciai floor space, the number of cars,
freight traffic, and industrial activity.
Why is it important to keep track separately of these "structural" fac-
tors? it could be argued, for example, that the trend seen in the residential-
sector energy consumption captures the effect of the growing number of house-
holds, so why count both? However, this supposes that growth in energy demand
depends only upon growth In these "structural" factors, in fact, total energy
demand (in a sector or a country) for a particular good or service is the pro-
duct of the amount of that good or service demanded and the energy intensity
(energy consumed per unit of good or service) with which it is delivered.
Because this energy intensity can change (in response to energy prices, changes
in technology, or other variabies), it is important to keep separate track of
the "structural" factors.
What is needed is a systematic approach to connecting energy statistics
with the "structural" factors that drive energy demand, We refer to the result-
ing statistics, which are typically expressed as energy consumption per some
unit of "structure," as indicators of energy demand.
Ratio of energy to GOP as an indicator
These indicators can be constructed at various levels of disaggregation.
in general, the more inclusive the indicator, the less useful it is. The most
inclusive indicator is the ratio of national energy consumption to gross domes-
tic product (E/GDP). Although it is popular and much-debated, the E/GOP ratio
is not a very useful indicator, it is difficult to interpret. Worse, it can be
misleading in that it may draw the uncautious interpreter to the wrong conclu-
sion.
if is one of our axioms that: The things that are really important are
the things that the E/GDP ratio hides. Two very important factors are lumped
together in the E/GDP ratio:
Changes in the mix of goods and services in the GOP; and
Changes in the energy intensity with which the particular goods and services
are produced.
in economies in which growth and change is occurring at a rapid rate,
these factors can shift relatively ciuickiy.
South Korea provides a good example of this. Economic growth in South
Korea has surpassed planners expectations, averaglnq neariy 9% per year over
the last 20 years. The share of manufacturing in the GDP has grown substan-
tially -- from 18% in 1970 to 34% in 1980 (Table 3). The manufacturing sector
itsel f has become "heavier" as the combined share of "heavy" and "energy-inten-
sive" industry grew from 47% in 1970 to 56% in 1978 (Table 4) leading one to
expect that the E/GDP ratio would have risen during the 1970s. Within each of
the manufacturing subsectors, however, energy Intensity declined sharply (Table
5). This drop is due both to energy conservation in factories already existing
in 1970 and to the addition of new factories that were more energy efficient
than the old ones. The latter occurred to such a large extent In heavy manufac-
tures that the overall energy intensity of the subsector was reduced by over
two-thirds! This was not due to massive energy conservation, but rather to the
very rapid expansion (from gross output of 300 billion won in 1970 to over 4000
billion won in 1978) of the heavy manufactures subsector.
The result of these and other changes was a decline of 6% in the Korean
E/GDP ratio between 1973 and 1979. Looking at the ratio alone would have
alerted us that something happened, but given us no clue as to just what that
was, or whether it reflected a permanent change.








b Heavy manufacturing consists of fabricated metal products, general machin-
ery, electrical machinery and eouipment, and transport machinery.
C Energy-intensive manufacturing consists of paper and pulp, chemicals, coal,
petroleum, nonmetallic mineral products, primary iron and steel, and nonferrous
metals.





Source: Major statistics of Korean economy.
a Based on 1975 constant prices.
Table 4. South Korea: Composition of the nnufacturing sector
(as percent of gross output)a
1970 1978
8.3 11.0 17.9 26 5 34.4
1.7 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.2
47.0 43 2 30.4 24.9 15.9





E/GDP "elasticity" is another over-used statistic that one sometimes en-
counters. E/GDP "elasticity" is typically a measure of how much energy consump-
tion responds to a given Increase In GOP. in economics, elasticity typically
refers to changes in demand for some good relative to changes in the price of
the good or the income of consumers, In theory, at least, both price and Income
are well defined quantitIes whose contents are not important to the relationship
with demand. Such is not the case with GOP. Indeed, it Is the changing content
of the GOP that is of critical importance In understanding the evolution of
energy demand. We cannot speak of a 1-unit increase in GOP in the same way as
we refer to a i-unit Increase in price or income, for whether that 1 unit is
composed of digital watches or it is composed of steel matters very much in
terms of the effect on energy demand.
An additional problem Is that the E/GDP "elasticity" is often calculated
in a simplistic fashion without inclusion of a variable for energy price, which
certainly has an effect on E (energy consumption) that should be kept distinct
from the income effect.
Indicators of Energy Oemnd
To better understand what is going on with energy demand, it is necessary
to disaggregate both total energy consumption and total GDP. The goal is to
connect the various pieces of the energy pie with the "structural" factors that
drive demand for each piece. For example, we would connect gasoline consumption
with the number of passenger vehicles, or if the data were available, the number
of vehicle-kllometres driven. The latter is closer to what actually drives gas-
oline demand, but may be a difficult number to ascertain. This is a common
dIlemma: the more accurately one tries to disaggregate both the energy and
structural sides, the more difficult it is to come up with the necessary data.
One nijst strive to represent the relationship between the energy demand and the
driving forces as finely as possible, without making Impossible data demands.
The first step is to disaggregate total energy consumption Into the var-
ious demand sectors. Typically, these are households; the "commercial" sector,
although this is somewhat of a misnomer, because the sector Includes government
operations; industry (including manufacturing, mining, and construction);
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Table 5. South Korea: Energy Intensity and growth in the
nnu lecturing sector
1970 1978
Energy Intensity (t-oe per million won at 1975 prices)
Light manufactures 0.65 0.41
Heavy manufactures 1.28 0 36
Energy-intensive manu factures 2.10 1.65
Gross output (billion won at 1975 prices)
Light manufactures 2053 8484
Heavy manufactures 294 4158
Energy-Intensive manufactures 1560 6547
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Source: Republic of China Statistical Yearbook.
a ML-oe = million litres of oil equivalent.
agriculture, forestry, and fishing; and transport. Properly, one should allo-
cate energy consumed in electricity generation to the demand sectors according
to their relative shares of electricity consumption. This disaqoregation is not
always so easy to make. For example, there is a fine line between transport of
goods and routine industrial or agricultural operations. (When does moving fish
or logs stop being fishing or forestry and become transport?) Often, one is
able to draw the line in theory, but actually allocating energy consumption in
accordance with the blueprint proves difficult.
One can develop some indicators at the sectoral level, but often this pre-
sents problems similar to those encountered with the E/GDP ratio. That is, many
different items are lumped together, and the relative shares of these different
items can change. For example, in the manufacturing sector one can express
total energy consumption in the sector in relation to total output of goods.
Because we cannot add together men's suits and tonnes of steel, however, output
must be expressed in some common unit, such as dollars or pesos (corrected for
inflation, of course). Table 6 shows data on energy use in the manufacturing
and mining sector of Taiwan. The ratio of total energy use in the sector to
sector output -- expressed in constant local currency -- fell by 2O between
1970 and 1980. The question one must examine is: Did the output of the sector
shi ft toward less energy-Intensive products? Because the ratio of energy use to
output also fell continually between 1961 and 1970 -- a period in which energy
prices did not increase -- it seems that, in fact, structural changes were tak-
ing place in the composition of the sector that pushed down its energy inten-
si ty.
Similar problems arise in developing aggregate indicators in the other
sectors. Energy use per household is a somewhat useful indicator, but here too
the average household changes with respect to both housing type and appliance
holdings. For nonresidential buildings, energy consumption per unit of floor
area Is sometimes used, but the mix of di fferent bui ldinq types changes with
time. In the transport sector, it is virtually impossible to develop a sectoral
indicator, because there is no common unit with which one could aggregate the
many services encompassed in the sector.
These problems do not mean that such sectoral indicators do not tell us
something, It is Just that they mix changes in the structure of the sector with
changes in the way energy is used to produce particular goods and services.
Indicators at the subsector level
As one disaggregates further, things become more clear (and the data be-
come harder to get!). In manufacturing, one can examine particular Industries.
Energy consumption may be determined by survey, and output expressed in terms of
Table 6. Taiwan: Energy in mining and enufacturing
1961 1965 1970 1975 1980
Commercial eneray
consumption (ML_oe)e 2374 3350 5765 8384 14448
Contribution to GDP
(million 1976 NT$) 39690 65736 141237 238142 440784
E/GDP (L/1000 NT$) 59.8 51.0 40.8 35.2 32.8
Index 147 125 100 86 80
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Table 7. PhilippInes: Indicalors of energy Intensitya in industry
(in berrels of oil equivalent per thousand 1972 pesos value-added)
a Energy consumption refers to petroleum use for direct consumption and elec-
tricity generation in each industry.
value added. Here too, the mix of outputs can change over time, but the outputs
In a particular industry are much more homogeneous and tend to vary less than
for the entire manufacturing sector. Sometimes, it is possible to use the
actual total physical output of an Industry (e.g., lonnes of steel). This is
preferable to value-added, which can be complicated by changes in prices re-
ceived for products. Data from the Philippines provide a cpod example of
industry-level indicators using value-added (Table 7). in all of the cases
shown, the ratio of oIl-product consumption to value-added has declined since
the 1979 oil price shock. These drops are certainly due in part to the govern-
ment' s aggressive energy-conservation program.
At the level of the Individual firm, it is easier to develop Indicators
using actual physical output. These energy Intensities are the most reliable
indicators of energy conservation, although here too there may be complica-
tions. Results from our Kenyan study are shown in Table 8.
In transport, the various modes must be considered. The most important
Indicators are those concerning passenger and freight transport. Often, it Is
difficult to make a precise disaggregation of energy consumption by transport
mode. Not all gasoline is used in passenger vehicles, for example. Most is,
however, and a useful indicator is gasoline consumption per vehicle. Even bet-
ter would be consumption per vehicle-kilometre traveled, but this Indicator is
usually difficult to come by. For land freight transport, one can make the
rough assumption that all diesel fuel used in transport is used In freight,
though this can lead one astray if a large number of diesel-fueled passenger
vehicles are entering the fleet. The Indicator is then the ratio of diesel-fuel
consumption to a unit of freight traffic, such as tonne-kilometres. Similar
indicators can be developed for air and rail transport, though the presence of
bunkers (fueling by InternatIonal airlines) complicates the situation with re-
spect to air transport.
Nonresidential buildings can be grouped by different types. As with In-
dustry, energy-consumption data can be gathered through survey. Table 9 shows
an example from our study In Kenya. Hotels can be an important part of the
economy in countries w1ere tourism is a major Industry. Here the appropriate
measure of energy intensity is the "guest-day" -- a measure of the service
provided by the hotel. The indicators strongly suggest progress in energy
conservation In Kenya's hotels.
-
In the household sector, the aggregate indicator "energy per household"
may be the only one for which data are available. There are no convenient mea-
sures of the service that households derive from using energy (i.e., energy per
meal), although in some cases It may be possible to develop them. Still, it is
1974 1975 1978 1979 1980
Logging/Wood products 2.45 2.94 2.45 2.64 2.10
Chemicals 0.51 0.49 0.33 0.36 0.31
Food processing 0.55 0.53 0.44 0.45 0.40
Textiles 0.85 1.06 0.73 0.69 0.61
Paper 2.55 2.59 2.84 2.96 2.80
Metal industry 1.42 3.64 3.34 3.28 3.45
Mining 2.23 1.94 1.86 1.90 1.67
Sources: Bureau of Energy Utilization; 1981 Philippine Statistical Year
Book.
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Table 8. Kenya: Indicators of enerqy intensity in industry
Source: Schipper et al. (1981). Based on data supplied by Individual firms.
Table 9. Kenya: Indicators of energy Intensity in hotels
(as energy per guestday)
Hotel Year Electricity Fuel
(kW.h) (MJ)
Factory Year
Energy use per output (MJ) Output
unitFuel Electricity
Vehicle assembly 1977 5000 2020 vehicle
1979 3550 1730
Truck assembly 1978 .1950 - vehicle
1979 1780 2195
Tires 1975 35600 8930 ton
1979 19940 5760
Tire recapping 1977 21700 3095 ton
1979 13700 3455
Cement (wet kiln) 1977 6200 290 ton
1979 6020 265
Cement (dry kiln) 1976 3950 310 ton
1979 3980 255
Paper/pulpinQ 1977 47500 - ton
1979 38800 -
Steel 1977 4070 2125 ton
1979 3840 2410
Creameries 1972 1940 170 L x iO3
1979 1480 350
Food processing 1975 6250 - ton
1978 4370 -
Soap 1977 12760 495 ton
1980 10700 545
1 1975 16.1 138
1979 14.3 102
2 1977 35.5 306
1979 23.7 253
3 1977 33.1 -
1979 30.1 146




et al. (1981). Based on data supplied by hotels and
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very important to keep track of structural changes in the household sector, as
it is the growth In appliance holdings that has driven residential energy demand
in the middle-income developing countries.
Using energy Indicators
Indicators can be used at different levels for different purposes. Per-
haps the main usefulness of indicators is simply that they shed more light on
what is happening to energy demand than ordinary energy statistics. By separat-
ing out some of the effects of structural growth, they can assist analysts in
assessing the impact of energy conservation, whether induced by prices or gov-
ernment programs. They can be used by planners or even plant managers to mon-
itor the energy productivity of industrial operations. Used with caution, they
can also allow assessment of where an industry or sector In one country stands
in relation to similar ones in other countries.
Indicators can also provide a basis for forecasting energy demand. They
make clear the linkage between demand for energy and the demand for goods and
services, and show how the relationship changes. Although they do not take the
place of formal energy-demand models, they help identify Important driving for-
ces and point out areas where data are needed.
Understanding Energy Demand in LlCs: Key Issues and Directions for Research
Role of traditional fuels
The so-called "traditional" or "noncommercial" fuels -- wood, charcoal,
dung, bagasse, etc. -- now make up a much smaller share of the total energy bal-
ance in the developing countries than was the case 20 years ago (Table 10).
This is, in part, because of switching to fossil fuels (especially In the weal-
thier developing countries), but is also an outcome of the enormous growth in
fossil-fuel consumption that has accompanied industrialization. Overall, con-
sumption of traditional fuels has continued to increase and, in many if not most
developing countries, most households still rely on the traditional fuels.
Higher incomes permit a transition to kerosine or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
for cooking needs and such a movement has been observed in many countries. At
the same time, there has been increasing use of blomass fuels by industry In
response to higher oil prices.
In general, there is a lack of good data with which one could quantify
both the magnitude of traditional fuel consumption and the dynamics of the move-
ment by households to fossil fuels. In-country research should try to address
this latter Issue as well as simply quantifying biomass consumption. There is
also a place for international research that would analyze results from dif-
ferent countries and perhaps draw some general conclusions about the dynamics of
energy use in the household sector.
Price and lncie elasticity of energy demand
The range of values that has been cited for the price and income elasti-
cities of energy demand in LICs is wide Indeed. More careful analysis of the
response to the changes in energy prices that have occurred in the last decade
is needed. In thIs analysis, it is Important to differentiate among demand sec-
tors, as the response to price changes can differ very much among them.
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Table 10. Role of wooda as an energy source
(percent of total energy consuept ion)
Sources: Asian Development Bank (1982); Latin American Energy Organization;
United Nations (Africa).
a Includes other biomass fuels (dung, bagasse, etc).
b Developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank.
Complicating factors that confound the traditional calculation of price
elasticities must be kept in mind. In Kenya, for example, the prices for small
lots of LPG and kerosine -- fuels used almost exclusively by homes -- increased
markedly between 1972 and 1979, yet demand more than doubled. The moderate
increase In incomes during that period meant that more homes could afford to buy
these fuels and the equipment needed for their use. However, it appears that
the key faclors were the pressure on the wood and charcoal supply and the migra-
tion of people to the edge of Nairobi, both of which forced up the demand for
commercial fuels. The lesson here is clear: energy prices are important deter-
minants of demand in LICs, but modeling the relationships among prices, capital
stocks, and incomes is complicated.
As for the response of energy demand to increasing income (particularly
household income), analysis of the experience of middle-Income developing coun-





India 69 63 57
Pakistan - 54 50
Indonesia 62 57
Thailand - 30 23
Philippines 55 38 34
South Korea 53 17 i
Malaysia 43 27 19









MI LDCs 69 58
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Effect of "new" capitmi equipment on energy use
Most developing countries are in some ways lucky that the jumps in world
energy prices occurred when they did, and not later. In many countries, much of
the capital stock-- factories, vehicles, and buildings-- that will be used for
the remainder of this century and beyond Is not yet In place. The potential for
building a capital stock that is attuned to today's energy prices is thus larue.
Sometimes, however, "new" equipment may In fact be old equipment. Many
developing countries have begun their own airlines and are using castoff equip-
ment from the West (particularly fuel-inefficient Boeing 707s). Older automo-
biles abound in many countries where the cost of new cars is inflated by import
duties, and entire factories that have become outmoded In the West may be dis-
mantled and reassembled in developing countries. These moves may be economic,
given the low cost of the "used" equipment, but the energy costs of oreration
should be evaluated.
Capacity expansion tends to push down energy intensity -- in part because
of the new capital being more efficient and in part because of economies of
scale, In a major hotel in Kenya, doubling of capacity brought a significant
decrease in use of energy per guest-day. Examination of consumption data showed
that the larger capacity saved more energy than the moderate conservation ef-
forts of the engineer. In Thailand, the energy intensity of a bottle factory we
visited was reduced signi ficantly when the size of the factory was doubled. The
new part of the plant, with computerized equipment, required only hal f as much
energy per bottle as the old part.
There is a danger of extrapolating future energy consumption based on
energy use in today's capital stock, which in many cases will account for but a
small (and inefficient) share of the future capital stock. Research into the
interaction between economic development and energy efficiency is needed.
Fuel switching
Fuel switching has been encouraged in many countries to reduce oil in-
ports. Although fuel switching is often associated with the goal of saving a
particular fuel, such as oil or wood, in our work we consider this as separate
from energy conservation, which has to do with improved efficiency of fuel use.
In large industrial and commercial establishments, we found rch evidence that
factories were ready to switch to the fuel that was the least costly to use,
taking into account both the cost of energy and the cost of equipment and main-
tenance. Sometimes the fervor for switching away from oil seems to have ob-
scured the cost of alternatives. Nevertheless, it is important to find areas
where fuel switching can occur or be stimulated. Substitution of mixed renew-
able/oil fuels for oil -- coconut oil and diesel fuel in the Philippines or cas-
ohol in Kenya and Brazil --or illegal switching to LPG in cars in Thailand show
that there is some flexibility In transport. In industry, there have been not-
able examples of switching to coal in the cement industry, but In other indus-
tries oil (or gas) is usually easier to use. Where natural gas is found, it may
readily enter the domestic market and replace oil. To understand fuel-switchina
possibilities, a detailed description of energy end-uses, consistent with a
countrys development plans, must be made.
In the residential sector, the interplay between commercial and noncom-
mercial fuels Is important and was mentioned. In Senegal, the gas company has
recently developed and successfully marketed a very inexpensive LPG water-heat-
ing device, It is hoped that these devices will relieve pressure on the rapidly
depleting forest. Because the cost of the LPG Is held down by controls, it
becomes cheaper than purchased wood or charcoal for boiling water. In all coun-
tries, it Is important to look more carefully at the changinq patterns of resi-
dential enerqy use, assessing the role of relative prices and the costs of the
equipment that use the various fuels.
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Role of energy conservation
The effect of energy conservation In affecting energy demand in LlCs often
seems to be misunderstood. By "energy conservation," we mean those activities
that reduce energy consumption through improved efficiency In use. This is di f-
fererit from "energy curtailment," though this too results in lower energy con-
sumption and may well be an appropriate response to energy shortages. Energy
conservation Involves making adjustments in energy-consuming equipment or in
provements in operation that permit the equivalent levels of service at less
cost, Energy costs are usually but not always the major driving force behind
conservation. Sometimes energy conservation occurs when It is not the major
goal, as when old machinery is replaced with more modern equipment.
The Important effect of new, more energy-efficient capital equipment was
discussed above. This will be the major way in which LIC economies become more
energy efficient, but conservation measures with existing capital stock are also
Important. We examined the extent of such measures inKenya before the 1979/80
oil price shock, and a discussion of our findings is given in the Appendix. In
general, the resultswere mixed, with some very successful exam,ples illustrating
that big savings are possible when firms put forth the effort.- This and other
examples Indicate, however, that the response of energy users to increased
prices and other conditions is lagged, and hindered by slow economic growth or
political instability. Thus, one cannot expect to see dramatic results over-
night, although sudden price increases for some fuels can result in drastic cur-
tailment of activities like driving or use of air conditioning.
Role of policy
Efforts to control growth in energy demand have been more aggressive In
some developing countries than in the already Industrialized nations, but little
Is known as to the actual effect of government policies. Policies can lead to
more efficient energy use, to outright curtailment of certain activities in the
hopes that energy savings will result, and in the long run to economic activity
that is less energy intensive. On the other hand, policies that restrain prices
can encourage energy consumption, as is well known.
We review a few government programs in the following paragraphs.
In Singapore, the government has restricted traffic flow in the downtown
area. During rush hours, cars must either have three or more occupants or pay a
special tax to drive downtown. This measure has noticeably reduced congestion
and traffic. Additionally, the government has imposed a thermal standard on new
office buildings, which, although under revision (through a joint project with
the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory), will ultimately reduce energy use per square
metre in large buildings.
The South Korean government instituted a series of audit and energy man-
agement programs in industry, resulting in savings documented by the Korean
Energy Management Association. The government has also promulgated weak thermal
standards for new housing. In the area of curtailment, the government has re-
quired that elevators not be used between the first few floors in bui Idings. We
observed, however, that most people rode elevators to the first floor at which
they stopped, then walked down-- illustrating that curtailment can be difficult
to enforce.
An important policy initiative in Thailand was the institution of energy
audits In Industry. Of course, there is no guarantee that the recommendations
of such audits will be taken, as was pointed out when we visited factories in
Thailand.
3 Barriers to conservation and ways to assist in overcoming them are dis-
cussed in the Appendix.
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In Venezuela, the government instituted a voluntary program by which car
owners would abstain from driving on a certain day of the week determined by the
last digit of their registration plates. Our observation (in 1981) was that
this policy had little effect, probably because the price of gasoline was so
low. However, experience from virtually all the countries in the OECI) suggests
that taxes based on the weight or displacement of a car do encourage the pur-
chase of lighter or smaller vehicles.
In the Philippines, energy audits were instituted in 17 major industries
as had been done in Thailand. In addition, each industry was required to insti-
tute conservation measures and submit quarterly progress reports to the govern-
ment. Along with price increases in fuels, this has resulted in a 15-20% im-
provement in energy efficiency in most of the energy-intensive industries.
The above examples emphasize a need for critical evaluation: I f a country
adopts a policy, can it be shown that it has had an effect on consumption beyond
what was caused by changes in prices and incomes? In Sweden, for example,
thermal standards on new homes were tightened in 1977. However, most homes
built in 1975 were close to the levels of insulation demanded in 1977. It was
difficult to maintain that the standards themselves caused the reduction In en-
ergy use observed in homes built after 1977. For developing countries, the need
to be able to track the impact of energy-use policies is critical, because the
rates of growth in capital stock are so rapid that a "mistake" -- a policy that
led to unintended side effects -- that was ignored for a few years could be di f-
flcult to undo if a large amount of energy-consuming capital was built during
those few years.
Concluding Observations: Assessing Future Energy Needs
Energy demand is the big uncertainty in the LlCs, Supplies are generally
ample (except in the case of wood), but expensive, Improving the understanding
of energy demand is essential to developing the type and amount of supplies that
will be needed in the future.
The rapidly changing nature of LIC economies and of energy use in them
makes it difficult to use simple models built from price and income elasticities
to forecast future energy needs, particularly when the nature of yet-to-be-
installed capital equipment Is uncertain. The transition from agriculture to
manufacturing, the substitution of energy-using domestic production for imports
of key finished materials, such as steel, chemicals, and paper, and other
changes all have major impacts on the E/GDP relationship. A better approach to
looking at the future involves assessment of the mix of future activities in the
economy and the likely levels of energy intensity of those activities. A "base-
line" scenario could then be compared with scenarios assuming different values
for the energy/output ratios or different activity mixes.
An important element Is the Impact of energy conservation. Many factors
are working for conservation in the developing world, including the increased
size of most industrial operations over time and the potential use of more
energy-efficient capital equipment. The mere process of development, which may
entail the expansion of energy-intensive activities, should not be construed as
"anticonservatlon." Our experience shows that new equipment coming on line in
the 1980s and 1990s need consume only 50-75% as much energy per unit of output
as existing equipment. Development assistance targeted to energy conservation
could help the LlCs actually achieve the potential savings. Just as economic
growth allows the Introduction of energy-efficient capital stock, greater energy
efficiency will foster GDP growth by freeing resources that would have been used
for imported fuels or expensive domestic energy projects.
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Appendix: Progress in Energy Conservation in Kenya
Kenya, like many other developing nations, was hit hard by the two big
increases in oil prices. Additionally, irregular rainfalls and maintenance
problems caused difficulties In the hydroelectric supply during several periods
between 1973 and 1981. Thus, there were ample reasons for firms and individuals
in Kenya to be interested in energy conservation. In our study (Schipper et
al. 1981), which we summarize here, we found mixed results.
Nominal prices of petroleum fuels in Kenya were about four times higher in
1980 than in 1973, and nominal electricity prices had approximately doubled.
When general price inflation is taken into account, however, one sees that there
was only a twofold increase in the 1973-80 perIod, and there was practically no
change in real fuel prices between 1974 and 1979. (Retail prices as of June
1980 were about US$0.63/L for motor gasoline, US$0.44/L for diesel fuel, and
US$0.33/L for kerosine.) The price of electricity for residential customers in
1980 (about US$0.07/kW.h) was, in real terms, below the level prevailing In
1973.
Aggregate data on petroleum fuel consumption confirms that qrowth in de-
mand has slowed considerably since 1973 and, more importantly, has been less
than growth in real GOP. From 1969 to 1973, the ratio of growth in petroleum
fuel demand to real GOP growth was 1.6, but from 1973 to 1980 the similar ratio
fell to below 0.9. This drop is certainly significant, but it should not neces-
sarily be taken as a sign of improved energy productivity within the major sec-
tors of the Kenyan economy. Although demand for all fuels (with the significant
exception of kerosine) showed slower growth from 1973 to 1980 than from 1969 to
1973, gasoline, jet fuel, and fuel oil were primarily responsible for the sharp
fall In the overall growth rate. The slower growth in fuel-oil demand was due
chiefly to increased hydroelectric production. As for gasoline and jet fuel,
the reduced growth in demand was probably due to curtailment of transport activ-
ity, which does not bring with It a proportional drop in economic production to
the same degree as does a decline in agricultural or industrial activity. To
clarify the changes we observed, we summarize our findings from each sector.
Signs of energy conservation
Industry
Several factors complicate the assessment of conservation progress, which
we measure in terms of reductions in the energy intensity of production or
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activity (i.e., energy use per unit of output or activity). Results of our sur-
vey of firms were given in Table 8. Capacity utilization can have a siqni ficant
effect on energy intensity. Some factories in Kenya are so pressed to produce
that they run In excess of rated capacity and lose energy efficiency in the
technical sense, although so doing may result In greater profits. Expansion of
capacity can affect energy efficiency, as large factories tend to use less en-
ergy per unit of output than smal ler, and newer less than older.
Despite these difficulties, most of the reduction in eneroy intensity that
we document here resulted from deliberate attempts to save energy. Conversely,
most factories that had not attempted to improve energy use had constant or
increasing energy intensities, indeed, our interviews and examination of data
on industrial energy use showed a clear distinction among firms. Some firms,
notably the most energy-intensive ones (cement, oil refining, and some steel
companies) showed a keen awareness of the economic benefits of energy conserva-
tion and of systematic energy accounting. Managers could pinpoint increases or
decreases in energy use relative to output and, signi ficantly, the reasons why
they came about. Interviews with transnational firms, even those whose energy
intensity is relatively low, revealed a similar awareness. The largest and best
documented conservation gains came from a firm that is a subsidiary of a multi-
national firm.
The status of conservation among other firms, however, is mixed. In one
firm, the engineers complained that the firm probably would not invest a small
amount to fix obvious leaks, improve boiler efficiency, or "optimize" a process,
even if the returns for such investments were large. One of our guides pointed
out that the boilers we had just viewed were run at unnecessarily high pres-
sures. An engineer at a metal-processing firm told us that he was satisfied
simply to be able to start the equipment in the morning. The managing director
of a very large and energy-intensive firm listed difficulties that held back his
conservation effort: poor organization, varying oil quality, high demand for
product that made high mill-capacity a more important factor than energy econo-
mies. The progress made toward more efficient energy use in his firm was slow,
in spite of the increasing size of the fuel bill. In contrast, a manufacturer
of food and household items had just hired an engineer who planned to make irn-
portant process modifications to reduce energy use. Several firms had discov-
ered sources of biomass scrap from other factories that would substitute for a
considerable fraction of their oil use, whereas others have discontinued use of
such scrap for boiler fuel because of pollution problems.
We found activities related to energy conservation scattered among the
firms we visited, but no clear trend. Those firms that had made efforts to
economize had generally succeeded; many firms simply had not tried. The data in
Table B illustrate that a wide range of firms were successful in reducing the
energy intensity of their operations, in general, we observed that reductions
in petroleum fuel intensity were much larger than reductions in electricity in-
tensity. This is not surprising given the relative trends in price. In some
firms, we found increases in energy intensity, particularly in electricity, de-
spite efforts to conserve energy. The data on creamery operations (nation-wide)
present a striking example, Fuel intensity had fallen since 1972, but electric-
ity use per unit output increased twofold. We believe that this increase re-
flects mechanization of older facilities. Of course, increased electricity
intensity does not rule out the presence of conservation practices; in the case
of the creamery, electricity Intensity would have been even higher in 1979 had
not measures been taken to reduce consumption.
The effects of capacity uti I ization and economies of scale need to be kept
in mind when interpreting energy intensities. We noted several firms that re-
duced energy intensities markedly without any apparent conservation efforts, in
almost every case where this was observed, the output of the firm had risen as
much as fivefold over the period examined. Similarly, firms whose output fell
during slack years showed increased energy Intensities in spite of reported con-
servation efforts, some of which we observed personally. The oil refinery, for
example, used more fuel per unit output in 1979 than in 1973, apparently because
reduced demand for its products forced it to run well below its capacity (al-




Data limitations prevented us from forming precise indicators of energy
intensity in the transport sector. There are indications of reduced activity
with respect to automobiles, as total automobile vehicle-kilometres traveled (as
estimated by the Automobile Association) increased by an average of 3% per year
between 1975 and 1979, while the estimated number of automobiles grew at a rate
of nearly 6%. Growth in gasoline demand was downsignificantly in the 1973-80
period, averaging 3.7% per year as opposed to 17% per year for 7969-73. Whether
the fuel efficiency of the automobile fleet improved is an open question, but it
is clear that its present fuel efficiency is very low, probably due to both poor
vehicle maintenance and congested traffic conditions. Higher import duties on
larger cars have apparently had some effect on the pattern of new-car purchases.
There do appear to be improvements In the energy efficiency of bus and
rail transport. The bus company in Nairobi noted a 10% drop in energy consump-
tion per vehicle-kilometre after a concentrated effort to improve operating
efficiency was carried out, and its intercity counterpart also observed energy
savings in 1980. Total energy use by the railroad was about 3.2 PJ in 1980 com-
pared with 6 PJ in 1977. During this period, there was no significant decline
in rail travel. The main reason for the dramatic decrease appears to be a rapid
shift from heavy diesel fuel and fuel oil to automotive diesel fuel, which burns
much more efficiently in locomotives. There was also some upgrading of the
locomotive stock. Finally, the replacement of older aircraft with wide bodies
during the 1970s held down the use of jet fuel relative to international pas-
senger traffic at Nairobi's airport.
Commercial buildinqs
The data we collected for commercial buildings show definite signs of
energy conservation among hotels (see Table 9) and mixed indications of conser-
vation actIvity among office buildings. It should be kept in mind that the
price of electricity, the major energy expenditure for most commercial build-
ings, did not increase nearly as much as did the price of petroleum fuels. We
found that some of the larger hotels had considered energy-conservation oppor-
tunities carefully, and solar water-heating systems (with collectors assembled
in Kenya) had been installed or were planned for many hotels. Office buildings
in Nairobi showed no clear trend, Of the 10 buildings for which we had several
years of electricity consumption data, two showed a signi ficant decrease in con-
sumption, two showed signi ficant increase, whereas the rest stayed at about the
same level of consumption.
Residences
It is difficult to characterize conservation efforts in the residential
sector due in part to changes in electricity tariff classi fication. We could
detect rio discernible drop in estimated residential electricity sales (not sur-
prising given that the real price of electricity fell by 20% from 1973 to
7978). Similar uncertainty applies with respect to residential use of petroleum
fuels, although It is noteworthy that total Kenyan kerosine consumption in-
creased at a faster rate between 1973 and 1980 than between 1969 and 1973. This
trend may reflect substitution of keroslne for wood in cooking.
Solar energy in bui Idings
One impressive trend that may be important for all of Africa was the
establishment of an active domestic solar hot-water industry in Kenya, repre-
snted by four firms by 1980 and more since. In 1976, there were only about 200
m of installed collectors, according to figures from all companies then active;
by 1980, there were nearly 3000 m of installed collectors, saving about 9 TJ of
fuel and electricity. This number has probably doubled since 1980.
Although the use of domestic hot water In homes and buildings in Kenya is
low today, it is growing rapidly, particularly in middle-class housing. New
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units using solar energy have been installed in large developments as well as in
upper-income rental and owned housing near the centre of Nairobi. If efficiency
and conservation is lmaciined as consumption of fuels and electricity avoided,
then solar energy represents an important future source of energy conservation
in a fast-growing area of end use. Manufacturers include those assembling Im-
ported components, and those fashioning collectors out of domestically available
mater i a Is.
Barr ers to energy conservation
Although we observed, as a general rule, that concerted efforts to reduce
energy costs were largely successful, there remain a number of barriers to Im-
proving the efficiency of energy use in Kenya (and similar developing coun-
tries). Lack of on-site expertise in improving the efficiency of existing
equipment is a common problem, particularly among locally owned firms. Compe-
tent engineers are often preoccupied, indeed overworked, just keeping the plant
functioning. There is also a lack of domestic sources of hardware to improve
the energy efficiency of existing equipment. The necessity of Importing some
conservation equipment causes problems with import formalities and restrictions
for those firms attempting to Invest in conservation.
Inability to organize workers and management hinders conservation ef-
forts. Several hotels experienced difficulty in training staff to manage
lights, cooling, and hot-water equipment. Most firms that we visited had di ff1-
culty providing energy-consumption data that should be on hand in every mana-
ger's office. Lack of In formation on actual energy-use patterns makes it di ff1-
cult to devise effective energy-management programs. We also encountered the
belief that little could be done to reduce enerqy use in the firm's operations,
as well as overwhelming management concern with other parts of factory opera-
tions.
A more subtle barrier to energy conservation is the protection of indus-
trial outputs by tan ff5 and other means. We were told that, in some cases,
profit margins may be so high as to make the gains afforded by more efficient
energy use uninteresting to the individual entrepreneur, even though the sum of
these gains would have a substantial positive impact on the overall balance-of-
payments of the whole country. Thus, these government subsidies may be causing
the private sector to underinvest in conservation.
Furthering energy conservation in developing countries
Although the potential for Improved energy productivity in developing
countries Is considerable, the task of realizing it is probably more difficult
in the LIC context than in the wealthier countries of the North. This Is due
both to the barriers discussed earlier and to the general lack of capital to
make investments in energy efficiency. Further, in the often volatile political
climate in many liCs, private decisions with respect to investment in energy
efficiency may use a much higher discount rate than is appropriate from the
longer-range perspective of national well being. Probably even more so than in
the industrialized countries, where the market is relatively well equipped to
respond to the demand for energy management products and services, there is a
role for government involvement to facilitate efficient use of energy.
-
An oft-cited basic principle is the pricing of energy at or at least near
its replacement cost. Without an accurate signal of the cost to the economy of
using energy, firms and consumers are unlikely to make decisions that result In
the wisest possible use of scarce resources.
For government action to be effective and targeted for the areas where it
is most needed, a detailed understanding of the patterns of energy use in the
economy is necessary. Once industrial energy use is better understood, the con-
servation problems and needs of individual factories or whole industries can be
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better addressed. Government authorities can play a key role in the establish-
rnent of thorough energy-use monitoring programs.
From our work In Kenya and observations from other countries, we see the
following pressing needs that should be addressed by energy authorities, trade
and professional societies within countries, and international donor organiza-
tions.
Training: Even in energy-intensive industries, where staff has always
dealt with high energy costs, there appears to be a great need for training of
both engineering and management personnel as well as assembly-line workers.
This is particularly important for local firms without access to the resources
of transnational corporations. We were reminded constantly of staff reluctance
to employ the most modern energy-saving techniques because of a lack of person-
nel trained to monitor them.
Implementation: The investment needs of conservation technologies are not
necessarily appreciated or understood by government and private authorities who
control investment. Support for conservation investments is called for in many
instances.
Evaluation: Better data on industrial energy use allows both managers and
authorities to follow the progress toward more efficient enerqy use. With such
information, better judgements about investment needs, and indeed future indus-
trial energy needs, can be made. Individual firms should also be assisted in
developing systems to keep better track of their energy use.
Import pOlIcies: Many Important conservation technologies can only be
Imported into LICs. We found evidence that import licences may be refused, or
that duties on Imported equipment may be prohIbitive. Although it is certainly
desirable for LICs to develop their own "conservation industries," it seems
advisable In the medium term to allow the importation of energy-saving equip-
ment, whose benefits will be felt immedIately.
Energy conservation is not a substitute for prudent development of local
energy resources, but it can signi ficantly reduce energy costs in the long run
as well as provide some near-term relIef to energy-related foreign exchange
problems. The World Bank and other organizatIons have called for massive
energy-related aid to low-income developing nations. We feel that serious con-
sideration should be given to aid that enhances the efficiency of energy use.
At present, it is institutionally easier to give or finance large energy-produc-
ing facilities with capital provided by donors or other lenders. Given the
scarcity of such capital, however, it seems prudent to demand that contributions
to LIC energy needs bring the greatest return possible. In contrast to most
energy-supply schemes, investments in energy efficiency have a diffused but
relatively rapid impact, and thus can be instrumental in helping financially
struggling developing countries through the present hard times. A long-range
energy-conservation program could considerably reduce the energy costs of devel-
opment, and provide energy savings that will probably be less expensive than
many of the energy-supply alternatives.
LOPG-TEF4 EFFECTS OF OIL PRI CE FLUCTUAT I 06 ON DEVELOP I P (X)UNTRI ES
WITH 'ECIAL REFERENCE TO ASIAN COUNTRIES
Yoshio Hara*
Major Econanlc Impacts on Developing Countries Produced
by Rising Oil Prices
Energy supply and demand In developing countries in the 1970s
In the 1970s, energy consumption In Asian developing countries generally
had grown sharply despite major oil price increases. The primary factor was
simply the substantial expansion of their economies. For instance, in terms of
gross national product (GNP) growth rate per capita between 1960 and 1977,
Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore had annual av-
erage growth rates of 3.6%, which exceeded the average for the middle-income
countries of the world. The growth rates in Indonesia and the Philippines were
3.3% and 2.5%, respectively, which also outpaced the average for low-income
countries, 1.4%. Taking these two countries as an example, it also is worth re-
viewing gross domestic product (GOP) growth rates in the 1960s and the 1970s.
in Indonesia, the GOP growth rate, which had stayed at 3.5% per year in the
1960s, grew sharply in the 1970s reaching an average of 7.7%. In the
Philippines, the rate also grew, from 5.1% in the 1960s to 6.4% in the 1970s.
Also, in terms of gross domestic investment, Indonesia, the Philippines,
South Korea, and Malaysia had high growth rates, exceeding 10% per year, while
Taiwan and Hong Kong also showed fairly strong growth rates, nearing 10% per
year. Thus, economic development associated with sharply growing investment In
the 1970s caused energy consumption to rise in Asian countries (Table 1).
As a result, taking Thailand and the Philippines as an example, their
energy elasticities to GNP or GDP were 1.72 and 1.34, respectively, between 1961
and 1978 (Table 2). Limiting the period to the 1960s, the values were as high
as 2.37 and 2.00, respectively. This means that their energy consumption grew
at twice the speed of their economic output. Between 1970 and 1978, however,
their energy elasticities declined sharply due to effects of the oil crisis.
To review the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption
from a different aspect, it is useful to compare commercial-energy consumption
Tab Jo 1 Percentage gowth of energy consumption
Indonesia 0.0 15.0 6.8
Thailand 19.9 7.0 13.6
Philippines 10.1 5.2 1.7
South Korea 14.7 9.0 12.0
Malaysia 10.1 8.1 9.1
Taiwan 9.9 11.9 10.8
Hong Kong 10.6 8.4 9.5
Singapore 5.0 16.6 10.3
New Zealand 4.8 4.6 4.7
Australia 5.9 4.3 5.1
Sources: United Nations (1912, 1974, 1971, 1979b).
*Chief Economist, The Institute of Energy Economics, No. 10 Mon Building, 18-1
Toranomon 1-chome, Minato-ku Tokyo 105, Japan.
196 1-70 1970-75 1961-78
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b-q b: 1970-77, c: 1960-76, d: 1974-76, e: 1960-77, f: 1974-77, and g:
1970-76.
per unit of GDP among Individual countries between 1961 and 1978 (FIg. 1). The
comparison produces several features of Individual countries depending on stages
of their economic development. As of 1961, Thailand consumed commercial energy
of 0.35 kg coal equivalent (kg-ce) per US$1 of GOP: this increased to more than
1 kg-ce In 1971. Likewise, commercial energy consumption in the Philippines,
which stood at 0.63 kg-ce in 1961, exceeded 1 kg-ce in 1971-72. After the 1973
oil crisis, however, commercial energy consumption turned downward in both coun-
tries. By contrast, South Korea and Taiwan have shown high growth In their com-
mercial energy consumption throughout the 1960s and the 1970s (Table 1), al-
though consumption levels sharply fluctuated year by year. In such advanced
countries as Australia and New Zealand, trends of energy consumption per unit of
GDP have been very stable (F 1g. 1) due -I-a the absence of drastic changes In
their economic and industrial structures.
Energy consumption In developing countries Includes a large portion of
noncommercial energy, such as firewood, charcoal, straw, bagasse, coconut
shells, and animal wastes. Even today, many countries In such areas as
Southeast Asia (excluding members of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN)), Southwest Asia, and the South Pad ftc cover more than 60% of their
total energy requirements with noncommercial energy. However, in the ASEAN
countries, which are making remarkable progress in economic development, the
ratios of noncommercIal energy 1-o total energy requirements diminished notably
between 1973 and 1978. During this period, the most dramatic decline In the
ratio was In Indonesia, from 60% to 40%, followed by the Philippines from 29'E to
28%, Thailand 25% to 21%, and Malaysia 15% to 13%.
Conseguently, the Importance of commercial energy has been growIng In
these countries since the second hal f of the 1960s. Simultaneously, dependence
Table 2. Energy elasticity in nine Pad fic countries, 1961_188
Country BasIs 1961-78 1961-69 1970-78 1970-73 1974-78
Nonenergy-exporti ng countries
Middle Income
Thailand GDP 1.72 2.37 0.75 1.12 1.02
Philippines GNP 1.34 2.00 0.73 0.89 0.99
South Korea GDP 1.16 1.37 0.90 0.83 0.89
Taiwan GDP 1.15 1.11 1.33 1.97 1.63
Singapore GDP 1.25 0.32 1.48 2.58 1.23
Industrialized
New Zealand GDP 136b 1.19 l.42 1.62
Energy-exporting countries
Low Income
Indonesia GDP 0.06 l.B4 1.05 379q
Middle Income
Malaysia GOP - 1.19 1.60 0.66
Industrialized
Australia GOP 1.09 1.09 1.38 1,10 1,39
Sources: Energy consumption data - United Nations (1972, 1974, 1977,
1979b); CEPD (1979). GDP data -- IMF (1979).
a For hydroelectric, nuclear, and Imported electric
kcal; GDP and GNP values are as of 1975.







962 I96 1Q66 196E
- 41 -





Fig. 1. Energy consumption per unit of GOP (coal-equivalent
kilograms per US dollar).
on oil has qrown sharply. Taking developing countries in East Asia as an ex-
ample, the average ratio of oil to total commercial energy consumption, which
was as low as 33% in 1960, grew to 49% in 1970 and reached 56% in 1973. Partic-
ularly noteworthy is the fact that oil dependence further increased to 58% in
1978 even after the oil crisis.
In addition, in rrost developing countries, excluding those with such do-
mestic resources as coal, hydroelectric potential, and natural gas, oil depend-
ence to cover their commercial energy needs reached nearly 80-100% during the
























Progress in industrialization and energy supply and deind
As indicated by Japan's history of economic growth, it is obvious that
progress in Industrialization contributes much to the expansion of energy con-
sumption. Between 1960 and 1977, when developing countries made rapid progress
in industrialization, the importance of industries and manufacturing industries
to GOP grew by more than 10% in the so-called newly Industrialized countries
(NICs), including South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. In contrast, in such
advanced industrial countries as Japan and Australia, the importance of indus-
tries and manufacturing industries has been declining, whereas that of the ser-
vice Sector has been increasing.
Figure 2 shows the relationship of two major light industries (food/agri-
culture and textile/clothing) to all manufacturing industries in individual
countries. The proportion, declining in parallel with progress in industrial-
ization, is less than 50% in South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. By compar-
ison, in 1977, the ratios of industrial energy consumption to total energy con-
sumption were 49% in South Korea, 64% in Taiwan, and 31% in Malaysia. Comparinq
1910 and 1977, the ratios of industrial to total energy consumption increased by
13.7% in the Philippines, 9.5% in South Korea, and 3.4% in Indonesia.
To give a clearer picture of the relationship between progress in indus-
trialization and energy consumption, I use energy consumption per worker in man-
ufacturing Industries by country (Table 3). in 1975, energy consumption per
worker was 6-7 tons coal equivalent (t-ce) in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan,
10-12 t-ce in South Korea, Singapore, and New Zealand, and 24 t-ce in
Australia. In short, the ratio between the lowest and the highest energy con-
sumption per worker stayed at 1:3.
Effect of soaring oil prices on the econonies of developing countries
As discussed so far, during the period from the 1960s to the early 1970s,
the energy-consumption pattern in developing countries was characterized by ap-
parently heavier oil dependence. Even the oil crisis in 1973 could not discour-
age this underlying trend of increasing oil dependence.
For instance, comparing 1969 and 1978, oil dependence Increased sharply
from 65.1% to 84.4% in Indonesia, from 46.5% to 61.1 in South Korea, and from
54.7% to 75.8% in Taiwan. On the other hand, three countries -- Thailand, the
Philippines, and Malaysia -- showed slight declines in their oil dependence
during the same period: from 96.5% to 94.7%, from 97.0% to 94.2%, and from
95.9% to 88.1%, respectively. However, the growth of their oil consumption
remained high, so that the energy structure continued to depend heavily on oil.
Such being the situation, the oil crisis in 1973 produced serious impacts
on the balance of payments of these countries. Table 4 contains indices of fuel
imports by energy-importing countries. These indices were obtained by multiply-
ing the Index of fuel prices by the index of imported fuel amounts based on
indices of fuel imports in value and in volume (index of fuel imports index of
fuel prices x index of imported fuel amounts). South Korea had the highest
import indices because it increased its imports during the 1973-78 period
despite soaring energy prices, in contrast, New Zealand showed the lowest indi-
ces because of gradual declines -in its energy imports during the same period.
However, the majority of developing countries showed greater or lesser increases
in their energy Imports between 1973 and 1978. As shown in Table 5, with the
exception of such oil-producing countries as Indonesia and Malaysia, ratios of
oil imports to value of total imports have grown sharply in individual develop-
ing countries, which intensi fled the pressure on their balance of payments.
For example, Thai deficits in energy trade, which had been growing year by
year since 1973, were offset to some extent by favourable exports up to 1974.


















Fig. 2. IndustrIal structures by country 1975. (Source: World Bank 1979.
Note: Food/agriculture, ISIC 311, 313-314; Textile/clothIng, ISIC 321-324;
Transport facIlIties/machinery, ISIC 382-384; Chemical products, ISIC 351-352.)
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Table 4 Indices of imports volume8)energy (payment, prices, and
(1974).
a Volumes are in terms of coal eguivalent.
account balance as serious as deficits in the balance of payments. In contrast,
NICs, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have improved their balance of current ac-
count since 1974 despite growing deficits in energy trade. This was because ex-
panding exports of Industrial products allowed NlCs to absorb increases in en-
ergy prices.
This can be better explained by indices of energy-import prices and in-
dices of export prices among energy-Importing countries. That is, while terms
of trade have been rather worsening since 1974 for Thailand and the Philippines,
the terms for such NICs as Hong Kong bottomed out in 1975-76 and started to im-
prove.
Changes in terms of trade by country can be summarized as follows:
In the case of nonoil-producing developing countries, such as the
Philippines, three changes are noted. They are, first, in addition to grow-
ing oil-import bills, Import prices of foods and others have increased sharp-
ly; second, inflation in advanced countries caused import prices of indus-
trial products to rise; and third, business recessions in advanced countries
resulted in a slowdown in the growth of export prices of primary products.
For NICs, the case of South Korea shows, first, despite sharper increases in
energy-import prices than experienced in Thailand and the Philippines and
temporary deteriorations in terms of energy trade in 1974 and 1975, whIch
were as serious as experienced by the other two countries, product export
prices, backed by competent industrial capability, started to increase
favourably after 1975; second, from the aspect of trade structure, the ratio
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Thailand Import payment 100 268 334 357 437 482
Import price 100 278 325 436 378 410
Imported volume 100 96 103 82 117 118
Philippines Import payment 100 301 346 401 447 472
Import price 100 307 338 356 377 397
Imported volume 100 98 102 113 119 119
South Korea Import payment 100 337 444 559 697 769
Import price 100 303 386 425 452 433
Imported volume 100 111 115 132 154 178
Hong Kong Import payment 100 271 280 359 419 435
Import price 100 266 294 289 337 325
Imported volume 100 102 96 124 24 134
Singapore import payment 100 305 305 379 408 475
Import price 100 319 380 392 418 475
Imported volume 100 96 80 97 98 100
New Zealand Import payment 100 273 289 307 325 298
Import price 100 250 277 327 338 332
Imported volume 100 109 104 94 96 90
Sources: Import payment and prices -- table 3-2-1; Imported volume -- ESCAP
Source: PDB (1980).
a Based on the achievement during the first 11 months.
b Based on the achievement during the first 6 months.
of energy imports to total imports was relatively limited, which alleviated
worsening terms of trade; and third, the country was able to increase exports of
light industrial products, etc. primarily to members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Thus, large differences are now surfacing between nonoil-producina devel-
oping countries and NICs in their deficits in current-account balance after the
oil crisis. Deficits in current-account balance can be offset to some extent by
such means as official transfer, drawdown in foreign-currency reserves, and
direct investment by foreign capital. Current-account deficits remaining even
after these measures are taken should be financed by overseas borrowing, It is
noted that the amounts of overseas borrowing required by energy-Importing devel-
oping countries, rose sharply first in 1974 but continue to prow year by year.
Under such circumstances, governments have been covering growing needs for
borrowing since the oil crisis by positive introduction of official funds from
external sources as well as from private funds, Such countries as South Korea,
Indonesia, and Malaysia, where export prices increased after the oil crisis,
have been particularly positive toward introduction of private funds partly In
anticipation of erosion of accumulated borrowing by inflation, However, need-
less to say, these borrowed funds should be reimbursed. Apart from a vicious
cycle of additional borrowing to pay Interest resulting from growing debts, the
second oil crisis produced serious impacts on the economies of many developina
countries, which are now standing in crucial positions.
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Table 5, Ratios of oil imports to total exports in developing Asian
and Pacific countries during the 1973-19 period (Ratios of oil
import bills to total exports in value)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Average
1975-78
Afqanistan 6.3 4.8 10.1 9.3 11.8 12.5 16.0 10.9
Bangladesh 6.8 20.7 25.1 30.1 45.5 32.3 22.5 33.3
Burma 4.0 0.3 5.2 5.4 1.4 - - -
Fiji 21.0 27.9 27.1 31.2 33.0 28.2 33.8 29.9
Hong Kong 2.9 6.9 6.9 6.2 6.5 5.6 6.4 6.3
India 9.0 17.6 31.1 24.6 25.4 28.5 29.3 27.5
Indonesia 1.4 2.5 3.6 5.1 6.7 5.0 6,0a 5.1
Kiribati 4.7 2.4 3.3 7.7 11.5 7.1 - 7,4
Malaysia 5.3 9.8 11.1 9.7 9.2 8.6 9.5 9,7
Nepal 21.1 20.5 16.7 17.2 246 22.7 20.4 20.3
Pakistan 6.8 13.7 32.0 32.4 35.1 33.3 33.5 33.2
Papua New GuInea 3.7 6.4 11.9 10.2 - -
Philippines 10.3 24.1 33.6 34.6 31.5 30.1 288a 32.5
South Korea 9.2 22.9 26.4 21.5 20.6 18.2 20,0a 21.7
Samoa 12.9 6.2 42.9 30.0 27.7 35.5 34.0
Singapore 18.0 34.5 37.1 37.7 32.4 30.7 31,2b
Solomon Islands 8.6 8.8 18.7 13.8 11.8 11.7 5.9 14.0
Sri Lanka 11.2 25.8 21.9 24.1 20.9 18.2 26.6 21.3
ThaIland 14.5 25.2 31.4 27.5 29.3 27.5 28.0 28.9
Tonga 14.0 12.9 15.7 45.0 28.6 43.3 41.4 33.2
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Effects or Economies of Developing Countries Produced
by Declining Oil Prices
Economies of developing countries after the second oil crisis
Despite the aftereffects of the first oil crisis, the world economy main-
tained a relatively high annual average growth rate of slightly more than 4% In
the 1970s. However, stagnation in the world economy was rapidly Intensified
after the second oil crisis in 1979. It is thought that the world economy in
1982 resulted in a zero growth. Reflecting the economic trend, the growth of
the world trade, which slowed from 6.0% in 1979 to 1.5% in 1980, declined to 0%
in 1981 and further to a negative value in 1982. Moreover, in nominal terms of
value basis, the world trade showed negative growth for two consecutive years,
thus falling into an unprecedentedly worsening situation.
The synchronized recessions worldwide and the diminishing world trade
directly hit the economies of developing countries and intensi fled debt crises
that they had been lacing since the first oil crisis.
As already mentioned, although developing countries had been taking posi-
tive stances toward economic-growth policies since the first oil crisis, many of
them are now In difficult financial situations characterized by accumulated for-
eign debts needed to cover growing development investment and by deficits in
current account balance. According to a survey conducted by the Development
Aids Council (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), outstanding medium- and long-term debts among developing countries
amounted to $626 billion as of the end of 1982. With short-term debts included,
total debts reached $863 billion (Table 6). Furthermore, including debts liable
to the USSR and East European countries, outstanding foreign debts in the world
are estimated to exceed $1000 billion. This amount is equivalent to 8% of GNP
in the world and 11% of that among advanced countries. Also, principal and
interest reimbursed in 1982 totaled a huge $346 billion, while the debt-service
ratio stayed at an unbelievable figure of 60%.
Taking the Philippines and Thai land as an example of nonoil-producing
developing countries in Asia, outstanding official foreign debts liable to these
countries rose 3.2 times and 3.9 times, respectively, in only 3 years, from $5.1
billion and $2.8 billion in 1979 to $16.6 billion and $11.0 billion at the end
of 1982.
Here, it is worth reviewing trends of economic activities in these coun-
tries during the 1980-82 period. In 1980, oil imports as a percentage of total
imports In the Philippines grew sharply to 30.4% from 24.2% in the previous year
due to increases of as much as 65.3% in the oil prices of OPEC. As a result,
oil-import bills also rose from $1.6 billion in 1979 to $2.5 billion in 1980.
However, in the same year, the Philippine economy achieved a real economic
growth rate of 5.4%, which was only slightly lower than the 6% growth of 1979.
The reason for the slight decline was that exports of the country's major
exports (such primary products as sugar, coconuts, and copper) increased (25.7%
over the previous year) nearly offsetting an increase in imports of which oil
was the centrepiece (26.2% increase over the previous year). However, real eco-
nomic growth rates deteriorated sharply in 1981 and 1982 to 4.8% and 2.6%, re-
spectively.
It is thought that poor market conditions for primary products, resulting
from the stagnation in the world economy, contributed much to the sharp de-
clines. Figure 3 shows the trends of price indices of major primary products in
Asia; most indices turned sharply downward in 1980. In fact, the Philippines
sugar and copper exports declined in value In 1981 by 114% and 22%, respective-
ly, from the previous year. On the other hand, OPE crude oil prices rose in
1981 by il.6% over the previous year, but finally declined by 3% in early 1982
due to sluggish oil demand. However, accounting for inflation during the
period, crude-oil prices in real terms declined by 1% in 1981 and 8.6% in 1982
from the previous years. Reflecting the downward trend in crude-oil prices, the
ratio of oil imports to total imports dropped to 25.6% in 1981 from 30.4% the
previous year. Also, the ratio of oil imports to total trade deficits decreased
from 135% in 1980 to 87.6% in 1981.
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Table Total foreign debts (in $1 or6. billion,
Note: Prepared from statistics issued by the DAC, OECD, CIA's reports (some
estimates included), etc. The debt service ratio was calculated by excluding
service exports.
For Thailand, the real economic growth rate in 1980 was 5.8%, slightly
lower than 6.1% in 1979. Although the rate rose as high as 7.6% in 1981, it
declined again in 1982 to 4.5%. The trend of economic growth rates in Thailand
is quite di fferent from other ASEAN countries, where economic growth rates have
declined steadily since 1980. Primary factors behind the unusual trends were
that the ratio of agricultural production to GDP, which is usually around 25,
increased in 1981 by 7,5% over the previous year, and the ratio of the farm-
product processing industry to GDP, which is usually about 21%, also increased
in 1981 by 10.2% over the previous year. The economic growth rate again turned
downward in 1982 due to such factors as the sluggish activity in the agricul-
tural sector (a decline of 1,2% from the previous year) and a slowdown in pri-
vate equipment investment, which was caused by sharp rises in domestic interest
rates resulting from the worldwide trend of high interest.
Oil-import bills in Thailand nearly doubled from $1.6 billion in 1979 to
$3 billion in 1980. As a result, the share of oil imports in total imports
increased from 22,8% in 1979 to 31.4% in 1980. However, due to declining oil
demand, the share of oil Imports decreased slightly In 1981 to 29.9%. The coun-
try's deficits in trade balance amounted to $2.7 billion and $2.9 billion in
1980 and 1981, respectively.
of developing countries
1979 1980 1981 1982
Outstanding medium- or long-term debts 406 465 530 626
Non-OPEC 332 385 445 520
OPEC 74 80 85 106
Official 146 166 188 218
Private 260 299 342 408
Short-term debts or official 133 165 230 237
military debts
Total foreign debts 539 630 760 863
Principal reimbursed 118 147 185 255
Medium- and long-term debts 50 50 61 71
Others 68 97 124 184
Interest reimbursed 38 56 80 91
Medium- and long-term debts 26 37 49 60
Others 12 19 32 31
Principal and interest reimbursed 156 203 265 346
Debt service ratio (DSR) 34.8 34.2 45.6 59.6
DSR (excluding short-term principal) 20.7 18.7 25.3 29.2
Ratio of foreign debts to:
The world's GNP 4.9 5.2 6.6 7.0
GNP of advanced countries 7.8 8.2 10.8 11.5
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Fig. 3. Price indices of major primary products in Asia. (Sources: "Asia
Trend", Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, Fareastern Economic Review.)
Based on these situations, direct and indirect effects produced by the second
oil crisis on norioi i-producing developing countries can be summarized as:
Directly affected by the sharp increases in oil prices in 1979-80, the eco-
nomic growth rate was forced to drop, therefore the growino oil-import bills
increased the aggravation of current-account balance.
Since 1981, the economies of developing countries have been facing double
crises due to both direct soaring oil prices and the indirect effects of the
oil crisis that include considerable declines In primary product prices
because of synchronized recessions in the world economy.
Fluctuations in economic growth rates shown by individual countries during
the period resulted from differences in their domestic production levels in
the agricultural sector, the agriculture-related processing industry, and
other Industries.
During the period, oil consumption has declined due to increasing domestic





Short-term impacts of declining crude-oil prices on the economies of developing
countries
Unfortunately, data are not yet available that would enable us to prove
the exact impact of the drop in crude-oil price decided by OPEC in March 1983.
However, generally speaking, it seems certain that recent cut in its
crude-oil price can produce favourable effects on advanced countries, NICs, and
nonoi I-producing developing countries, although not on OPEC members. Signs of
such favourable effects have already appeared. The U.S. economy finally seems
to be coming out of the prolonged recession and market conditions for primary
products have been showing intensi fled upward trends since March 1983.
Taking NlCs in Asia as an example, their exports in the January-March
period increased by 40% over the same period of the previous year with elec-
tronic parts, household electric appliances, and textiles as the centrepieces.
At the same time, Thailand and the Philippines have also been showing higher
growth of their exports, primarily in the field of primary products. Thus, the
current situation implies that individual countries should record higher eco-
nomic growth in 1983 than achieved in 1982. The recovery of advanced economies
and resulting expansion of exports of industrial and primary products can be
regarded as indirect effects produced by the cut in crude-oil price.
Needless to say, a direct effect of declining crude-oil prices is the
downturn of oil lmort costs for individual countries. For instance, assumlnq
that Thailand would import in 1983 the same amount of crude oil as in 1982, the
country could save $400 million this year on its oil import bill, for the
Philippines and South Korea, the saving would be $200 million and $700 million,
respectively.
In a sharp contrast to nonoi I-producing developing countries and NlCs
enjoying the direct favourable effect, OPEC members are now facing critical sit-
uations in their trade balance. As a result, a number of social and economic
development projects, which have been promoted at a high level in oil-producing
countries, will now be canceled or substantially delayed. For developing coun-
tries, these developments in oil-producing countries introduce new problems,
such as reductions in their exports of building materials used in plant con-
struction and declines In the amount of foreign currency remitted by their work-
ers as a result of reductions in foreign labour by Middle Eastern countries.
Thus, close attention must be paid to both sides of the effects produced by
declining oil prices.
Another disturbing point in the short run is the problem of Inflation. In
many Asian countries, having suffered continuously from two-digit inflation
(fueled by the second oil crisis), consumer prices finally settled in 1982.
However, a return to two-digit inflation is auite probable in the course of
their economic recoveries that are derived mainly by the expansion of exports.
As mentioned before, the problem of accumulated debts among developing
countries has already entered an extremely serious stage. In other words, even
if as a result of the recent declines in crude-oil prices the world economy
could recover from the prolonged recession, the problems of financial crises and
accumulated debts that confront developing countries could not be solved easily
In the short run.
Declines In crude-oil prices and alternative energy development
As pointed out earlier, energy consumption in Asian developing countries,
although It declined temporarily after the first oil crisis, continued to grow
throughout the 1970s slightly more slowly than their GDP growth rates. However,
after the second oil crisis, energy consumption, particularly oil consumption,
dropped to lower than previous levels for two consecutive years In 1981 and
1982. This was because of government policies, including pricing policy, to
curb consumption and because of diminishing demand resulting from recessions.
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Final ly, we cannot neglect the favourable effects of alternative energy
policies taken by Individual governments in paral tel with energy conservation
policies. An excellent example Is the successful geothermal energy development
in the Philippines. Since early 1977, when the first geothermal power plant of
3 MW was constructed in Tongonam, the country has expanded its geothermal power
generation capacity so that It now exceeds 600 MW. Also, In Thailand, natural
gas supplies initiated in 1981 now contribute to lowering Its domestic oil con-
sumpt ion.
Alternative energy developments expected to be In progress in the coming
years include hydroelectric power in Malaysia, coal and brown coal In Indonesia,
and lignite in Thailand. Geothermal development projects planned by Indonesia
and Thailand are also promising. Furthermore, Thailand and Malaysia are now
considering industrial development plans to make the best use of their abundant
natural-gas resources and Indonesia Is also planning for a similar policy. The
Malaysian plan includes production of methanol, urea, and sponge Iron from
natural gas and instal lations of new thermal power plants. Thus, It is probable
that these countries will establish their own natural gas-based steel and chemi-
cal industries in the future.
These moves imply a drastic change in their attitudes from the conven-
tional concept of exporting oil and natural gas to advanced countries as energy
resources without first doing any processing. In other words, these countries
have a new concept of establishing industries that produce Industrial materials
through effective utilization of their domestic energy resources, thus promoting
both production and exports of Industrial products that they had been Importing
previously.
Then, the problem Is how recent declines In crude-oil prices will affect
these movestoward alternative energy development in developing countries. To
start with a conclusion, It is believed that these moves, in principle, can be
further promoted in the coming years, although slight delays may be caused by
the effects of declining crude-oil prices.
The reasons for the conclusion are:
Potential energy demand in developing countries is quite strong and an upturn
of energy demand will be inevitable In the course of their economic recover-
ies. In the long run, growing energy demand also seems to be invevitable due
to such factors as population growth and expansion of their economies.
Alternative energy development that developing countries are now promoting
involves without exception conventional types of energy that are naturally
competitive with Imported oil to some extent.
On the other hand, the development of new energies (solar power generation,
petroleum liquefaction, etc.) carried out by advanced countries can be more
seriously affected by declining oil prices, because they require huge devel-
opment costs and are stilt at the development stage in technological terms.
Alternative energy development In developing countries has been conducted In
a direct link with their domestIc industrial-development plans. It is ex-
pected that developing countries will increasingly steer their efforts In
this direction in the coming years.
If any factors can cause delays In alternative energy development in
developing countries, one will be the problems of current-account deficits and
accumulated debts, which are likely to remain unsolved for some time and can
impede the raisIng of required development funds.
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Lonq-term Impacts of Oil Price Fluctuations on Developing Countries
Long-term outlook for oil prices
It is nearly impossible right now to predict the long-term trends of
crude-oil price, which was officially reduced by the OPEC for the first time in
March. However, considering factors that can affect oil-price levels in the
future, the trend of oil demand is likely to play a much more important role
than in the past as a determining factor unless a sudden accident temporarily
causes drastic changes in the supply-demand relations. This means that oil will
be dealt with in the market as an economic good Just like other primary pro-
ducts. Thus the supply-demand relations will demonstrate a stronger influence
than in the past in determining the price. Then, one of the two most critical
factors that can determine oil-demand levels in the future is the growth of the
world economy, the other is the levels of alternative energies, such as nuclear
power, coal, and natural gas. In other words, future trends or levels of crude-
oil prices will be based on the supply-demand relations that basically reflect
these factors at any one time. It should be noted, however, that crude-oil
prices will not always represent fair price levels for either the supply or the
demand sides. For instance, a very sharp increase in crude-oil prices resulting
from tight supply-demand relations, although temporarily and greatly benefiting
the supply side, should lead to diminishing demand that, in turn, causes the
price level to turn downward again. An excellent example of this case is recent
declines In crude-oil prices.
Table 7 shows the long-term fair levels of crude-oil prices, which were
calculated on the basis of an assumption that crude oil is one of the economic
goods required to develop economic activities, It indicates the fair levels of
crude-oil prices relative to the economic power of advanced countries that hold
signi ficant shares
Table 7, Fair crude-el I prices to Jcr countries
Source: IMF, International financial statistics.
Local currency per USS.







1972 63.8 68.1 62.1 79.0 71.6 55.9
1982 135.2 171.9 248,8 139.5 184.5 302.2
Ratio 1982/1972 (A) 2.119 2.524 4.006 1.766 2.577 5,406
Exchange rate8
1972 303.11 - 2501.8 3188,6 5044.3 583.22
1982 242.52 1619.3 2418.5 6857,3 1397,7
Ratio 1982/1972 (B) 0.8 - 0.647 0,758 1.359 2.397
GNP
1972 134.115 1489.1 98.75 1000.5 1332.5 116.489
1982 204.182 1851.2 108.84 1199.4 1743.6 151.936
Ratio 1982/1972 (C) 1,522 1.243 1.102 1.199 1.309 1.304
Fair priceb 40,31 31.37 28.56 27.93 24.82 29.41
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in crude-oil trade. To calculate the levels, three explanatory variables were
used: inflation rates, exchange rates to US dollars, and GNP growth rates. Ac-
cordingly, if West European countries, whose economic power is relatively weaker
among advanced countries, are taken as the standard, a fair level of crude-oil
prices is around $28 per barrel at present.
On the other hand, to apply the same concept for developing countries re-
quires adjustments of exchange rates, because many developing countries set the
rates at levels dissociated from reality. Taking this point into account, a
tentative calculation showed that a fair crude-oil price level to developing
countries is around $25/barrel. Needless to say, these tentative calculations
provide only a reference point. At any rate, it seems that fair crude-oil price
levels in the long run will be formed by reflecting supply-demand situations as
well as economic power (crude oil-purchasing power) of individual consuming
countries including developing countries.
Long-term oil supply and demand outlook for developing countries
To quantitatively forecast the world energy supply and demand in the long
run is as difficult as to predict oil-price trends. According to such a fore-
cast announced by the International Energy Agency (lEA) last fall, oil consump-
tion in OECD countries will continue to decline until the year 2000 (low-demand
case, Table 8). This is because the growth rate of energy demand as a whole is
expected to stow down and because the importance of nonoll alternative energies
(nuclear power, natural gas, and coal) is likely to further increase. On the
other hand, the lEA predicts that energy consumption, particularly oil demand,
in non-OPEC developing countries will rise rapidly in the coming years. As a
result, the lEA's forecast concludes that the world demand for OPEC oil will not
diminish in the 1990s or afterwards. Of course, no one can guarantee that
actual situations will develop exactly as predicted by the lEA. However, these
forecasts are generally made based on three basic estimates: first, the growth
rate of the world economy; second, growth rate of primary energy demand; and
third, the rate at which alternative energies are introduced. Therefore, judg-
ing from achievements In the past, the economies of developing countries are
expected to expand by achieving higher growth rates than those of advanced coun-
tries, if the world economy, supported by the recent crude-oil price cut, con-
tinues to recover at a relatively favourable pace.
It is also expected that energy demand in developino countries will con-
tinue to grow faster than their economic growl-h, on the average, due to such
factors as progress in urbanization, promotion of the policy of industrializa-
tion, modernization of agriculture, and population growth.
Conclusions
Compared with oil-producing and oil-consuming countries, developing coun-
tries have least room for exerting influences on oil supply-demand and price
trends. However, once sharp fluctuations in oil prices occur, it is developing
countries that are most seriously affected. This was proved by the two oil
crises in the past. So long as no one can guarantee that an unexpected fluctu-
al-ion (an increase) in oil prices will never occur in the coming years, develop-
ing countries must make continuous efforts to reduce their oil dependence
through such political measures as alternative energy development and energy
conservation.
Alternative energy development in individual developing countries, which
has been encouraged from their experiences of the two oil crises, is now produc-
ing fruitful results. As mentioned before, the Philippines and Thailand are
- 54 -
a The lower figures are based on the oil price increases/low economic cirowth
scenario.
b Rate of conversion: Million barrels/day = 48.2 million tonnes
oil-equivalent, or 1 tonne oil-equivalent = 7.57 barrels.
C Non-OPEC developing countries (including South Africa and Israel).
d Including synthetic fuel oil.
e Forecasts for OPEC are based on "possible" output, which is estimated on
not only confirmed reserves but expected additional reserves. The forecast for
1985 reflects lower demand. For 1990 and 2000, output in capital-surplus
oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, Is
predicted to be lower than technically available output.
Communist countries: COMECON countries in and outside Europe and includes
China, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.
Increases in terms of volume obtained in the refining process (which are
not increases in terms of weight).
typical countries making remarkable progress in this field, the former in geo-
thermal development and the latter in the development of natural gas and lig-
nite. As a result, the weight of imported oil in primary energy supply and
demand is expected to decline sharply in both countries. Then, even if oil
prices fluctuate suddenly in the future, the resulting impact on these countries
wHl be much less significant than in the past. Reflecting recent declines In
oil prices, people around the world, including advanced countries, are calling
for a review on alternative energy development from the economic aspect. Now
ever, so long as there is no guarantee that sharp increases in oil prices will
never occur in the coming years, alternative energy development must continue.
Table 8, Energy demand in OECD countries and worI,d oil supply and demand
in million barrels per day°
1980 1985 1990 2000
OED
Total primary energy demand 79.1 81-82 89-93 105-121
Nonoll energy demand 40.4 46 55-56 72-78
Oil demand 38.7 35-36 34-37 33-43
Demand for imported oil 24.2 21 20-24 18-30
World oil demand
OECD 38.7 35-36 34-37 33-43
OPEC 2.9 4 5-6 8-9
Non-OPEC developing countriesc 7.9 9-10 11-13 17-22
Total 49.5 48-50 50-56 58-74
World oil supply
OECD 14.8 15 14-13 15-13
OPEC 27.5 23-26 27-29 24-28
Non-OPEC developing countries 5.3 8-9 8-11 9-13
Net exports (net imports) by
communist countries 1.3 1-(1) 0-(2) 0-(2)
Increases resulting from
refining9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Total 49.5 48-50 50-52 49-53
Excess demand - - 0-4 9-21
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Meanwhile, improved efficiency of energy use is the only measure that will
enable developing countries without any energy resources to deal with increases
in oil prices. However, although developing countries have followed this course
as a political policy during the past decade, little progress has been made in
producing tangible effects. In this light, developing countries must, in the
cominq years, increase their efforts for improving efficiency of enerciy consump-
tion by such measures as introduction of facilities of appropriate scale when
they plan to carry out new development projects.
From these viewpoints, developina countries are now certainly coming to be
able to cope with fluctuations (increases) in oil prices to some extent, al-
though they are still highly vulnerable to oil-price fluctuations.
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